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67 
Restoration Constitutionalism and Socialist 
Asia 
 
BUI NGOC SON*• 
Abstract: In the course of political transformation in post-
communist East Europe, many nations chose to return to the 
constitutional order predating the domination of communism, 
the phenomenon scholarly characterized as “restoration consti-
tutionalism.” Recently, China and Vietnam – two socialist na-
tions in Asia – have witnessed the relatively similar phenome-
non: past liberal constitutional values have been employed to 
struggle for constitutional reform, which challenges the com-
munist status quo. This phenomenon is particularly striking in 
Vietnam in the circle of constitutional revision in the 2010s. 
This paper considers discourse of restoration constitutionalism 
in contemporary socialist Asia with particular focus on the case 
of Vietnam. The percept of this paper is that radical rupture is 
not a necessary condition for the operation of constitutional-
ism; instead, it is the constitutional continuity that provides the 
viability of constitutionalism. Discussing the discourse of res-
toration constitutionalism in China and Vietnam within this 
framework, the paper argues that restoration constitutionalism 
presents the new path of the development of constitutionalism 
in socialist Asia. 
Key words: Restoration constitutionalism, transitional 
constitutionalism, China Constitution, Vietnam Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutionalism is a legally limited government.1 Today, under 
modern Western liberal form, constitutionalism–consisting of funda-
mental elements of popular sovereignty, prescriptive constitution, rule 
of law, separation of powers and other checks and balances, protection 
of individuals’ liberal rights, judicial review, and judicial 
ence2–has achieved a global expansion.3 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, communist regimes in East Eu-
rope have gradually transformed to new democracies committed to fun-
damental principles of liberal constitutionalism.4 One of the distinctive 
transitional modalities in East Europe is the return to the constitutional 
order predating the domination of communism, the phenomenon scho-
lastically characterized as “restoration constitutionalism.”5 
Different from post-communist East European states, China and 
Vietnam, former members of the Soviet bloc, have consistently re-
mained in the Soviet-style polity ruled by a communist party. But the 
notable phenomenon relatively resonant with transitional constitutional-
ism in post-communist East Europe is that past liberal constitutional 
values have now been employed in China and Vietnam to struggle for 
constitutional reform, which challenges the communist status quo. Be-
fore the triumph of communism, there existed liberal sources of consti-
tutional thinking and practices in China and Vietnam. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, constitutional experi-
ence in the two nations was basically shaped by fundamental concepts 
of Western liberal constitutionalism, such as a written constitution, pop-
ular sovereignty, representative government, liberal rights, and the sepa-
 
 1. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 24 
(2005) (“Constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government.”).  
 2. Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Generic Influences and Generic De-
fects, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 533, 535-36 (1993). 
 3. Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Changing Landscape of Modern Constitu-
tionalism: Transitional Perspective, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U.L. REV. 174 (2009). 
 4. See generally Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 447 (1991).  
 5. To illustrate, the 1946 Constitution of Hungary was used as a model during the Hungari-
an roundtable talks of 1989; the former Czechoslovakia relied on the Constitution of 1920 as the 
basis for drafting the “new” Constitution after the revolution; Latvia restored the effect of the 
1922 Constitution since May 1990; the 1938 Constitution was the basis for Estonia’s constitu-
tional draft; and the Constitution of 1921 was the basis for constitutional drafts in Georgia. Ruti 
Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 
2009, 2069-70 (1997); see also Andras Sajo, Preferred Generations: A PARADOX OF 
RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONS, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 854-855 (1993).  
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ration of powers.6 Recently, these liberal constitutional values have 
been summoned in the call for constitutional reforms. Particularly in 
Vietnam, where the party and the state have initiated the plan to com-
prehensively revise its 1992 Constitution, culminating in its replacement 
by the 2013 Constitution, the call for a return to some liberal values of 
the 1946 Constitution – the first constitution of the nation – has been 
forceful.7 In this paper I used the Vietnamese experience to explore the 
possibility of restoration constitutionalism in the course of constitution-
al development in socialist Asia. 
The focus of this paper is the phenomenon of “restoration constitu-
tionalism,” understood as “a process under which, as part of the liberal-
izing agenda, the transitional society is sought to be returned to the con-
stitutional order that prevailed before the eclipse or collapse of 
democracy and/or the rule of law, rather than being faced with the pro-
spect of fashioning a new constitutional order.”8 The percept of this pa-
per is that radical rupture is not a necessary condition for the operation 
of constitutionalism; instead, it is constitutional continuity that enables 
the viability of constitutionalism. Discussing the manifestation of the 
discourse of restoration constitutionalism in China and Vietnam in that 
framework, this paper argues that restoration constitutionalism presents 
the new path of the development of constitutionalism in socialist Asia. 
This paper is structured as follows: Part I justifies restoration constitu-
tionalism; Part II considers the implicit trend toward restoration consti-
tutionalism in Chinese constitutional discourse; Part III delineates and 
analyzes the rise of restoration constitutionalism as a form of discourse 
in contemporary Vietnam; and Part IV concludes. 
I. RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A theory of constitutional foundationalism, elaborated by Ameri-
can constitutionalist Bruce Ackerman, has provided a powerful frame-
work for conceptualizing the nature of constitution-making. It holds that 
constitution-making is the final stage of liberal revolutions, a revolu-
tionary “constitutional moment” of rupture from the past, and founda-
tional for a new constitutional democracy.9 Therefore, the discontinuity 
 
 6. See Bui Ngoc Son, The Introduction of Constitutionalism in East Asian Confucian Con-
text: The Case of Vietnam in the Early Twentieth Century, 7 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 429-30. 
 7. Thu Ha, Cựu chủ tịch Quốc hội bàn chuyện sửa Hiến pháp [Ex-President of the National 
Assembly Commenting on Constitutional Amendment], TUAN VIETNAM.NET (Jun. 16, 2010), 
http://www.tuanvietnam.net/2010-06-24-cuu-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-ban-viec-sua-hien-phap. 
 8.  Venkat Iyer, Restoration Constitutionalism in the South Pacific, 15 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 39, 40 (2006). 
 9. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 488 
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is the quality of revolutionary constitution.10 
Constitutional foundationalism has been theorized on the data of 
eighteenth century constitution-making, especially of the United States, 
and hence may not be valid for understanding constitution-making and 
constitutionalism generally. In the West, “ancient constitutionalism” 
largely relied on the power of the past. For instance, the Roman concept 
of mos maiorum, literally “the ways of our ancestors”, among other 
things, operated as constitutional restraint on the government of the 
Roman republic.11 In imperial East Asia (China, Korea, and Vietnam), 
the discourse and the practice of “Confucian constitutionalism” are 
equally past-oriented.12 The li (ritual)–a Confucian form of unwritten 
constitution consisting of traditional norms and institutions– functioned 
as constitutional restraint on the imperial power.13 
Even in the modern era, the reference to the past in constitutional 
discourse is evident. For example, British constitutionalism both in pre-
modern and modern times particularly features the existence of “consti-
tutional convention,” which indicates the power of the past or constitu-
tional tradition.14 Even in the United States, constitutional scholars often 
summon the authorities of the founding generation to advance their ar-
guments. For example, some scholars invoke the 1776 Declaration of 
Independence and the Preamble of the 1787 U.S. Constitution so as to 
develop a new paradigm of constitutional populism.15 Moreover, Amer-
ican theorists of originalism in constitutional interpretation particularly 
mobilize for “restoring the lost constitution” or returning to the original 
meanings of the U.S. Constitution as it was codified in Philadelphia in 
 
(1989). 
 10. See generally id. 
 11.  For ancient constitutionalism, see Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and Constitutionalism: Dis-
puting the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian Polity, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 201 (2009) [herein-
after Ritual and Constitutionalism]. 
 12. Id. 200-01. 
 13. Chaihark Hahm, Confucian Constitutionalism (2000) (unpublished S.J.D dissertation, 
Harvard Law School) (on file with Harvard Law School Library); Theodore de Bary, The “Con-
stitutional Tradition” in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 7 (1995); Jaeyoon Song, The Zhou Li and Consti-
tutionalism: A Southern Song Political Theory, 36 J. of Chinese Phil. 424 (2009); Bui Ngoc Son, 
Confucian Constitutionalism in Imperial Vietnam, 8 Nat’l Taiwan U. L. Rev. 373, 381 (2013); 
Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian 
Polity, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 200-01 (2009). 
 14. ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION cxliii (Roger E. Michener ed., LibertyClassics ed. 1982) (1885).  
 15. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82 (1999). 
See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36-41 (2004). 
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1787.16 
Constitution-making of transitional societies in the late twentieth 
century provides further counter-evidence to the foundationalist claim 
of revolutionary constitution. A theory of constitutional constructivism, 
as opposed to constitutional foundationalism, illuminated in the works 
of Ruti Teitel at New York Law School, claims that constitution-making 
in East and Central Europe and South Africa during the substantial po-
litical transformation in the late twentieth century serves as not the cul-
mination of the revolution but the actor in construction of the transfor-
mation.17 Teitel argues that the constitutional foundational theory can 
only best describe the traditional or eighteenth century constitutional-
ism, but is not suited to explain the emergence of transitional constitu-
tionalism in the periods of substantial political transformations in the 
late twentieth century.18 
Political transformations in post-communist East Europe were 
largely peaceful, and hence best known as “velvet revolution[s].”19 Tei-
tel demonstrates that: “The velvet revolutions generally lacked clean 
breaks, and as such did not culminate in constitutional change of a 
foundational sort. Years after the political changes, and in much of the 
region, the story is of constitutional continuity.”20 The implication of 
constitutional change accompanying the smooth political change is that: 
Whereas revolution by violent means implies rupture in 
the constitutional regime, velvet revolution implies forced con-
tinuity instead. The dilemma of the tension between constitu-
tionalism and political change disappears, for there is no dis-
continuity, only constitutional continuity. As in other 
negotiated transitions, constitutions play a role in ratifying the 
agreements constructing the political shift, as well as in restor-
ing the prerevolutionary constitutional order.21 
Constitutional change through the restoration modality or restora-
tion constitutionalism is part of a broader picture of transitional consti-
tutionalism. Restoration constitutionalism is a project of peaceful politi-
cal change, presents constitutional continuity, and evades the dilemma 
of constitutional beginnings. “To the extent that such transitional consti-
 
 16. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 90-94 (2004). 
 17. RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 9 (2000). 
 18. Id. at 2051 
 19. Id. at 2067.  
 20. Id. at 2068. 
 21. Id. 
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tutions are restorative, there are seemingly no constitutional beginnings, 
only returns. Such constitutionalism eliminates the tensions inherent in 
constitutionalism in periods of political change.”22 
Constitutional continuity is not exceptional to the phenomenon of 
restoration constitutionalism. Long ago, German philosopher G.W.F. 
Hegel developed an “immanent” approach to constitutional law which 
suggests that constitutionalism is the self-determination of identity of a 
given people, an ongoing social and historical process.23 In the same 
vein, Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, asserted that the US Constitution “is most significantly not a 
document but a stream of history.”24 Similarly, Okoth-Ogendo posits: 
“Constitutionalism is the end product of social, economic, cultural, and 
political progress; it can become a tradition only if it forms part of the 
shared history of a people.”25 Therefore, history constitutes an intrinsic 
ingredient of constitutionalism, and hence constitutional continuity is 
the nature of viable constitutionalism.26 
Robert Lowry Clinton’s differentiation of the written constitution 
with the “underlying constitution” or the “real constitution” can be help-
ful in elaborating the logic of constitutional continuity.27 Based on the 
more metaphysical concept of Etienne’s “Constitution of Being” as a 
composite of formal essence and actual existence, Clinton argues that: 
The constitution of any polity is a being that reflects the 
dominant underlying decisional predispositions of that polity’s 
citizenry. The constitution of a polity is thus a composite of 
that polity’s formal essence and its actual existence. Since the 
essence of any being is that which ensures that being’s self-
identity and lack of internal contradiction, the essence of a 
constitution, whether of a polity or of an individual, is that 
 
 22. Id. at 2070 
 23. G.W.F. HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 256-63 (Stephen Houlgate 
ed., T. M. Knox trans., 2008).  See also Michael Salter & Julia J. A. Shaw, Towards a Critical 
Theory of Constitutional Law: Hegel’s Contribution, 21 J. L. & SOC’Y 464, 466 (1994). 
 24. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 33 (1988).  
 25. W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an Afri-
can Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 80 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).  
 26. See generally J. David Greenstone, Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the 
Constitution, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 428 (1988); for accounts of the relations of history and political 
tradition to constitutionalism, see CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND 
LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michel Rosenfeld ed., Duke University Press 1994); 
Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 530-31 (1999); DONALD S. 
LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 16 (2006). 
 27. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 58-59 (1997).  
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which ensures the self-identity and internal coherence of that 
polity or individual.28 
Self-identity and internal coherence of a polity are ongoing actual 
experiences that involve different generations, and a written constitution 
adopted in a given time cannot provide a panoply of consequential as-
pects of the polity with the proviso that it is not an authoritarian consti-
tution, an opprobrium to a true constitutionalism. Thus, “any truly via-
ble constitutionalism,” which “presupposes the idea[s] of constitutional 
being as a composite of formal essence and actual existence,”29 is in-
volved in cross-generation constitutional evolvement. That is why Jed 
Rubenfeld argues that a constitutionalist government is comprehensible 
only when the constitutional being – the people – is conceived as a 
cross-generation entity: “[A] people consists not of a set of persons here 
and now, but of the temporally extended sets of persons − past, present, 
and future − who will have lived under the rule of a particular political 
and legal order.”30 
Michael W. Dowdle’s recent theory of “constitutional listening” 
equally underscores the essential position of history in the development 
of constitutionalism.31 He asserts that: 
At its heart, a constitutionalism must both identify and 
distinguish its polity. It must distinguish who it covers from 
whom it does not, and justify its special claim to govern that 
polity as opposed to other possible alternatives . . . And in 
identifying a political identity, history provides the best source 
material for constitutionalism. It is history that distinguishes 
the collective “people” of one particular terrain from those of 
another. It is through reflection on that history from which the 
seemingly distinctive collection of values and concerns that 
identify and distinguish one nation from another are derived. 
By emphasizing these distinctive values and concerns, a con-
stitution can identify itself as uniquely symbiotic with that pol-
ity.32 
With the above understanding in mind, constitutional continuity is 
not a normative requirement but a sociological reality of viable constitu-
 
 28. Id. at 60.  
 29. Id.  
 30. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 154 (2001).  
 31. Michael W. Dowdle, Constitutional Listening, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115, 152 (2012). 
 32. Id. at 151-52. 
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tionalism. Chaihark Hahm is correct in stating that: 
It may well be that the emphasis on radical rupture as an 
indispensable condition for the operation of constitutional gov-
ernment has been exaggerated or misguided . . . A sense of 
continuity with the past may be a logical necessity for constitu-
tionalism generally.33 
I venture to conclude that it is the constitutional continuity that en-
ables the viability of constitutionalism. Given that, restoration constitu-
tionalism is not an exceptional phenomenon. The logical necessity of 
constitutional continuity induces us to the conviction that any viable 
constitutionalism must be restorative to various degrees, and the par-
ticular phenomenon of restoration constitutionalism is just a distinctive 
embodiment of this logic. 
II. CHINA AND RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. China’s Past Liberal Constitutional Experience 
According to Albert Chen, “[W]estern ideas of constitutionalism 
and democracy were introduced into China in the late nineteenth centu-
ry.”34 The reason for introducing constitutionalism was to help China 
“counter more forcefully the encroachments of Western and Japanese 
powers.”35 Chinese reformers like Kang Youwei and his prominent dis-
ciple, Liang Qichao, adopted in the early stage Western liberal constitu-
tionalist ideas, particularly under the influence of the Meiji Reformation 
and its concomitant, the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which engendered 
their petition for institutional reform to the Emperor of the Qing dynas-
ty.36 The Hundred Days’ Reform (from June 11 to September 21, 1898) 
was the practical consequence of Chinese early liberal constitutional 
awareness.37 
Empress Dowager (Cixi) defeated Kang-Liang’s reformist cam-
paign and later introduced a plan for constitutional reform by enacting 
the General Principle of the Constitutional Government of 1908.38 This 
 
 33. Ritual and Constitutionalism, supra note 11, at 202. 
 34. Albert H. Chen, Pathways of Western Liberal Constitutional Development in Asia: A 
Comparative Study of Five Major Nations, 8 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 849, 873 (2010). 
 35. Xiaohong Xiao-Planes, Of Constitution and Constitutionalism: Trying to Build a New 
Political Order in China, 1908-1949, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 37 (Stéphanie 
Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2010).  
 36. Qianfan Zhang, The Constitution of China: A Constitutional Analysis, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 2−3 (2012).  
 37. Id. at 3−4. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
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plan, mirroring the Meiji Constitution, which in turn drew from the 
German Constitution of 1871, anticipated a constitutional monarchy 
with an elected parliament and responsible government.39 
But, the imperial proposal of a constitutional monarchy had no 
chance to be realized. The 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen put 
an end to the Qing dynasty, and subsequently the new Republic of Chi-
na (ROC) was established in 1912.40 Albert Chen points out that: “[i]n 
the first one and a half decades of the republican era, several constitu-
tions – mainly, Western-style and liberal democratic in orientation – 
were promulgated or drafted by successive governments in Beijing.”41 
However, these constitutional documents, including the Provisional 
Constitution of 1912, the Tiantan Draft Constitution of 1913, and the 
Constitution of 1923, were far from effective due to complications 
caused by warlords and civil strife.42 
The warlords were defeated in 1928 by Chiang Kai-Shek, a leader 
of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang or KMT) previously 
created by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and the national government of the ROC 
was established in Nanking.43 However, the KMT engaged in a civil war 
with the Chinese Communist Party (created in 1921) until 1936 when 
the two parties entered into an alliance to confront the Japanese inva-
sion.44 The KMT sought to materialize Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three-stage 
program of Chinese political transformation.45 The three stages includ-
ed: military government for ending warlords and unifying the nation, 
the constitutional democracy under the KMT’s political tutelage, and 
finally the full liberal constitutional democracy.46 To implement the 
second stage, a provisional constitution called the Constitution of the 
ROC in the Period of Political Tutelage was enacted in 1931.47 As to the 
third stage, a new Constitution of the ROC was promulgated in Decem-
ber 1946, which is still effective in Taiwan today.48 Its original purpose 
was “to move China from the stage of political tutelage by the KMT to 
a full liberal constitutional democracy with a government based on the 
separation of powers, elected by free multiparty elections, and re-
 
 39. Id. at 4, n.4. 
 40. Chen, supra note 34, at 873-74. 
 41. Id. at 874.  
 42. Id.   
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.   
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; Ralph N. Clough, The Enduring Influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan To-
day, CHINA Q. 1054, 1057 (1996).  
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spectful of civil liberties and human rights.”49 
The KMT government was defeated by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) on the mainland and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, continu-
ing the effect of the 1946 Constitution of the ROC.50 Taiwan has incre-
mentally entered into the group of new Asian liberal democracies in the 
late twentieth century based on the 1946 Constitution and the enactment 
of the Additional Articles and serial constitutional amendments in 1992, 
1994, 1997, 1999, and 2005, with the 1999 amendment voided by the 
Council of Grand Justice for being unconstitutional.51 
Xiaohong Xiao-Plannes concludes that: “During the first half of 
the twentieth century, the Chinese adopted Western constitutionalism in 
order to reorganize political power and to modernize the state.”52 Thus, 
prior to the triumph of communism, constitutional discourse and prac-
tice in China was largely shaped by fundamental concepts of Western 
liberal constitutionalism: written constitution, popular sovereignty, free 
election, liberal rights, and the separation of power. 
B. China’s Communist Constitution 
After triumphing over the KMT, the CCP founded the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949.53 In the early stage, the new 
communist regime relied on the “Common Program of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference” as a provisional constitu-
tion.54 In January 1953, the Committee for Drafting the Constitution of 
the PRC was created and chaired by Mao Zedong.55 The first constitu-
tion of the PRC was adopted in 1954, mirroring the 1936 Constitution 
of the Soviet Union. The second constitution of the PRC was passed in 
1975 as the embodiment of the “extreme leftist ideology” and the reflec-
tion of “the achievements of the Cultural Revolution,” an initiative of 
Mao Zedong in 1966.56 Two years after Mao’s death, “another extreme 
 
 49. Chen, supra note 34, at 874. 
 50. Id. at 877. 
 51. For Taiwan’s liberal constitutional transition, see Wen-Chen Chang, Transition to De-
mocracy, Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism: Taiwan in Comparative Constitutional Per-
spective (2001) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with the Lillian 
Goldman Law Library) (discussing Taiwan’s liberal constitutional transition); Jiunn-rong Yeh & 
Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 
AM. J. COMP. L.  805, 805 (2011). 
 52. XIAO-PLANES, supra note 35, at 56.  
 53. Chen, supra note 34, at 877. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Mo Jihong, The Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of China and Its Develop-
ment, 23 Colum J. Asian L. 137, 160 (2009). 
 56. Id. at 139, n.1. 
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leftist constitution” was enacted in 1978.57 
The fourth Constitution, which remains in force today in China, 
was promulgated in 1982 as the expression of Deng Xiaoping’s reform 
and opening policy, with several amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 
2004.58 The 1982 Constitution restored many principles of the 1954 
Constitution. The constitutional amendments committed to socialism 
with Chinese characteristics,59 a socialist market economy, a rule of law 
state, and the protection of human and private property rights.60 Funda-
mental principles – the Four Cardinal Principles – underpinning the 
Chinese communist constitutional order insisted on socialism, the lead-
ership of the CCP, the people’s democratic dictatorship, and Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the im-
portant thought of the Three Represents.61 
C. China and Restoration Constitutionalism 
The PRC has remained a state ruled by one party. However, ac-
cording to Albert Chen’s observation, “since the Dengist era of ‘reform 
and opening,’ beginning in the late 1970s, China has moved a long way 
from a totalitarian communist system, in which the party-state con-
trolled all social and economic domains and all aspects of citizens’ 
lives, to an authoritarian political system that has committed itself to 
certain standards of legality.”62 The liberalization of the economy 
through practicing the “socialist market economy” has resulted in corre-
sponding institutional and constitutional changes in more liberal direc-
tions, such as the constitutional commitments to the promotion of the 
rule of state law and the protection of individual rights.63 In this new re-
formist context, the Western-style liberal constitutional discourse in 
China has more space to develop.64 It is in this context that past liberal 
constitutional values may have the chance to return in the constitutional 
 
 57. Jihong, supra note 55, at 142. 
 58. Id. at 139 
 59. XIANFA [Cpmbl. (1982) (China). 
 60. The narration of Chinese communist constitutions is drawn from Mo Jihong, The Consti-
tutional Law of the People’s Republic of China and Its Development, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 137, 
168. (2009). 
 61. XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] (1982) pmbl. (China). 
 62. Chen, supra note 34, at 878.  
 63. See generally Dingjian Cai, The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of 
Chinese Society, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 6, 8 (2005).  
 64. Yu Xingzhong, Western Constitutional Ideas and Constitutional Discourse in China, in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 1978−2005, at 111−40 (Stéphanie Balme & Michael 
W. Dowdle eds., 2010); see generally Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward A Legal Enlightenment: Discus-
sions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125 (2000). 
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discourse in contemporary China. Let us illustrate by the discussions of 
Qianfan Zhang and Gao Quangxi. 
Consider first the discourse by Qianfan Zhang, a Chinese constitu-
tional law scholar at Peking University Law School, expressed in his 
book The Constitution of China, which is perhaps the most illuminating 
work on Chinese constitutional law produced in English. He begins the 
book by discussing the social meaning of a gathering of thousands of 
Confucian scholars initiated by Kang Youwei, regarded as “China’s 
most influential constitutional entrepreneur,” to prepare to petition the 
Emperor against signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan.65 Zhang 
construed the gathering as the first organized popular constitutional 
movement in China. He ends the book by calling for the “Third Repub-
lic” in China with the same popular constitutional thinking.66 
In Zhang’s treatment, Dr. Sun Yat-sem created the First Republic 
after the 1911 revolution, and the Second Republic, still in existence, 
was created after the Communist Revolution of 1949.67 Zhang is critical 
of the Second Republic under the single rule of the CCP; he believes 
“the situation in some ways can be seen as even worse than it was in 
1908, when the Empress Dowager promulgated the first Constitutional 
Outline, since the current ruling Communist Party seems even more re-
sistant to the fundamental changes that are essential to China’s constitu-
tionalism.”68 He then anticipates the potential of the Third Republic, 
which will practice constitutionalism.69 For him, a revolution is by no 
means a necessary condition for the creation of the Third Republic be-
cause the Communist Revolution has failed to bring about constitution-
alism to China and it is unlikely that another revolution can lead to a 
different path.70 Instead, Zhang proposes: “This Third Republic is not to 
be forcibly established by any revolutionary vanguards who see them-
selves as morally and intellectually superior to ordinary Chinese people 
but rather to be brought about precisely by the common people them-
selves, through their daily actions in defending rights and giving sub-
stance to existing constitutional provisions.”71 To practice this, “the 
CCP must somehow ‘return power to the people’ (huanquan yu min), a 
challenge that has perplexed China even since revolutionary National-
 
 65. Zhang, supra note 36, at 1-5. 
 66. Id. at 262-64. 
 67. Id. at 40-43 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 198. 
 71. Zhang, supra note 65, at 263.  
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ists ‘established tutelage politics.’”72 
Zhang does not explicitly articulate a model of restoration consti-
tutionalism, but his proposal of the Third Republic implicitly indicates 
to a certain degree restoration constitutional thinking. He locates Chi-
na’s future constitutionalism in the old-century stream of Chinese con-
stitutional history.  Zhang’s popular constitutionalism as the model for 
the Third Republic especially resonates to a certain degree with the so-
cial meaning of Kang Youwei’s First Civic Constitutional Movement 
and Sun Yat-sen’s political constitutional thinking. 
We now turn to the case of Gao Quangxi, a Chinese scholar of 
Chinese and Western political philosophy. Gao is well-known for his 
advocacy of political constitutionalism as opposed to judicial constitu-
tionalism supported by many Chinese legal scholars.73 Gao is particular-
ly influenced by Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dualistic democracy, 
which distinguishes between extraordinary politics (constitutional poli-
tics) and ordinary politics (constitutional law).74 Gao’s chief position is 
that the creation of constitutionalism involves the transition from ex-
traordinary politics to ordinary politics, and from revolution to constitu-
tionalization.75 He recognizes the dilemma between revolution and con-
stitutionalism: while a revolution is a radical breakup of an existing 
political order, constitutionalism involves the establishment of an en-
durable political order and superimposition of limitations upon the revo-
lutionary power.76 Therefore, according to Gao, the establishment of 
constitutionalism or the process of constitutionalization “can only be 
achieved by a counter-revolution of the revolution, and a conservative 
force that is peaceful and reformist rather than violent and revolution-
ary.”77 With this position in mind, Gao extols the Glorious Revolution 
of seventeenth-century England as the paradigm of constitutionaliza-
tion.78 
To apply that theory to the case of China, Gao particularly under-
scores the significance of an extensive understanding of modern Chi-
nese constitutional history, which must be broad enough to cover at 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. See generally Albert H. Y. Chen, The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Con-
temporary China, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400385 (discussing Gao’s political constitu-
tionalism).  
 74. Id. at 15. 
 75. Chen, supra note 34, at 15. 
 76. See id. at 16. 
 77. Id. at 30.  
 78. Id. at 31. 
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least a one full century.79 Looking at modern Chinese constitutional his-
tory, Gao suggests that there exists three and a half constitutional Chi-
nas: (1) the Republic of China founded in 1921; (2) the Republic of 
China created by the KMT and controlled by it until its democratization 
in Taiwan; (3) the PRC under the CCP’s leadership; and (3 ½) today’s 
not-yet-unified-China, which will hopefully become a new unified Chi-
na that is “free, constitutional and democratic.”80 Within the PRC, Gao 
hypothesizes three stages of constitutional development, which, in the 
view of Albert Chen, seem resonate with Sun Yat-sen’s three-stage po-
litical program.81 Gao’s three stages consist of a “Revolutionary Consti-
tution” (the 1975 Constitution), a “Reformist Constitution” (the 1982 
Constitution), and “a Constitution of Constitutionalism.”82 Gao believes 
that in the final stage, the party-state may be transformed into a consti-
tutional democracy.83 
For Gao, Chinese constitutionalism is in the transitional period.84 
Gao explains that the 1982 Constitution is instrumental in terminating 
radical ideology and revolution, establishing a stable political order, and 
restoring the state institutions prior to the Cultural Revolution.85 In addi-
tion, its four amendments introduce liberal concepts of the rule of law, 
human rights, and private property.86 With these developments, Gao ex-
plains China’s Constitution is “a constitution that is undergoing gradual-
ist reform and that embodies of a kind of transitional constitutional-
ism.”87 
In Gao’s theory, the process of constitutionalization in China is not 
yet complete, and a Constitutionalist Constitution in its final stage is 
still ahead. He attributes the failure of Chinese constitutionalism to “the 
overwhelming power of radical force of revolution and the relative ab-
sence or weakness of the conservative force of constitutionalization.”88 
Seeking the conservative force of constitutional reform, Gao returns to 
modern Chinese constitutional history at its early stage. In this regard, 
he idiosyncratically underscores the social meaning of the Qing Abdica-
tion Decree of 1912.89 Abdication presents peaceful political change as 
 
 79. Id. at 18-19. 
 80. Id. at 19.  
 81. Chen, supra note 34, at 23. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id. at 27. 
 85. Id. at 24. 
 86. Id at 26. 
 87. Chen, supra note 34, at 27.  
 88. Id. at 31 
 89. Id. at 32 
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opposed to radical revolution, constituting the constitutional foundation 
for the creation of the republic. For Gao, Qing abdication was “the Chi-
nese version of the Glorious Revolution” and the embodiment of “the 
real conservative spirit of constitutionalism.”90 
From a macro-historical perspective, Gao argues that the 1911 
Revolution and the Qing abdication mark the beginning of China’s cen-
tury-old search for constitutionalism, which shares universal constitu-
tional values with modern states in the world.91 According to his treat-
ment, the adoption of the 1982 Constitution and its amendments 
indicate that fundamental modern constitutionalist values have been in-
crementally incorporated into China’s Constitution.92 Viewed from this 
perspective, the 1982 Constitution and its amendments are a return not 
merely to the original Socialist Constitution of 1954, but to century-old 
grand tradition of modern Chinese constitutionalism.93 Commenting on 
this point, Albert Chen demonstrates that although Gao has not explicit-
ly pointed out what exactly this grand tradition is, “it is reasonably ar-
guable that it is that inspired by the constitutional thought of the 1911 
Revolution and of the Republic of China found in 1912, and which con-
tains the seeds of liberalism and democracy planted by the 1946 Consti-
tution of the Republic of China that have born fruits in Taiwan today.”94 
While Gao is inspired by Ackerman’s constitutional theory, he, 
like Qianfan Zhang, believes that a revolution is not necessary for a 
constitutionalist order, but rather Chinese constitutionalism can be 
achieved through a peaceful transition.95 Future constitutionalism in 
China, in Gao’s imagination, is not a clean break with the past.96 In-
stead, Gao is quite supportive of the model of restoration constitutional-
ism.97 This support is discernible in his return to past liberal constitu-
tional experience in his search for conservative and peaceful force of 
Chinese constitutionalization.98 For him, future Chinese constitutional-
ism is the continuation of Chinese century-long tradition of modern 
constitutionalism.99 Moreover, this grand tradition shares general consti-
tutional values with modern states in the world. It seems Gao believes 
 
 90. Id. at 21. 
 91. Id. at 27. 
 92. Chen, supra note 34, at 27. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 33. 
 95. Id. at 30. 
 96. Id. at 31. 
 97. Id. at 33. 
 98. Chen, supra note 34, at 33. 
 99. Id. 27. 
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that, by returning to this grand tradition, China’s constitutionalism will 
one day converge with “world constitutionalism” – the term coined by 
Ackerman.100 
However, there are some indispensable limits in the restoration 
constitutional discourse of Gao Quanxi and perhaps of China in general. 
Chinese past-oriented constitutional discussions tend to be implicit ra-
ther than explicit, which is comprehensible. Within the current political 
environment of the party-rule state, an explicit call for a return to the 
past liberal constitutional values means a direct attack to the domination 
of the CCP and Chinese socialism generally; hence is unlikely to be al-
lowed to be expressed publicly. This is also the cause of another limit: 
Chinese restoration constitutional discourse tends to be metaphysical 
and has refrained from proposing a concrete constitutional design. In 
short, modern China has rich liberal constitutional experiences and con-
stitutional restoration discourse is possible implicitly, but it is confront-
ed with considerable obstacles. 
III. VIETNAM AND RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Similar to China, Vietnam possessed a liberal constitutional expe-
rience before the domination of communism. Importantly, liberal values 
were embodied in the first constitution of the nation, Hồ Chí Minh’s 
1946 Constitution, which shares some commonalities with Sun Yat-
sen’s 1946 Constitution. In contemporary Vietnam, the liberal values of 
the 1946 Constitution witness a striking return in the discourse on con-
stitutional reform. This section examines Vietnam’s past liberal consti-
tutional legacies which include prerevolutionary liberal constitutional 
discourse, Hồ Chí Minh’s liberal constitutional thinking, his 1946 Con-
stitution, and the rise of restoration constitutionalism in the circle of Vi-
etnamese constitutional reform in the 2010s. 
A. Vietnam’s Past Liberal Constitutional Legacies 
1. Prerevolutionary Liberal Constitutional Discourse 
In the first half of the twentieth century, Vietnam was under the 
colonization of the French and the Nguyễn dynasty was titular at Huế.101 
During this period, Vietnamese nationalists adopted fundamental values 
of Western liberal constitutionalism so as to counter against the colonial 
 
 100. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
771 (1997). 
 101. See Bui Ngoc Son, supra note 6, at 425. 
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power.102 
In the early twentieth century, Western ideas of liberal constitu-
tionalism were introduced in Vietnam by Confucian nationalist intellec-
tuals (most notably, Phan Bội Châu, Phan Chu Trinh, and Huỳnh Thúc 
Kháng) through their revolutionary movements and organizations (such 
as Eastern Exodus Movement, and Vietnam Restoration League, Resto-
ration Movement, and the Tonkin Free School).103 They were particular-
ly inspired by the Meiji Constitution, Chinese institutional reform (the 
Hundred Day’s Reform), the 1911 Revolution by Sun Yat-sen, and the 
writings of Chinese reformists, such as Kang Youwei and Liang 
Qichao.104 Consequently, constitutionalism under the Western form has 
become an inextricable part of their anti-colonialism, as they believed 
that constitutionalist institutions and values were instrumental to mod-
ernization of the nation and could eventually restore sovereignty from 
their invaders.105 On the ground of Western liberal constitutional 
framework, the Confucian patriots criticized the arbitrary power of co-
lonialists and the despotic power of the imperial government.106 The 
Confucian patriots then called for national independence and creation of 
a constitutional government mirroring Western standards, such as writ-
ten constitution, popular sovereignty, popularly elected parliament, mul-
ti-party system, separation of powers, liberal rights, and judicial inde-
pendence.107 
During World War I, new Western-style intellectuals emerged in 
Vietnam that were similar to the traditional intellectuals in the advocacy 
for Western liberal constitutionalism. They included Nguyễn An Ninh; 
Phan Văn Trường; the La cloche fêlée [1923-1926] and L’Annam 
[1926-1928] newspapers; Phan Anh and the Thanh Nghị group; and 
Nguyễn Tường Tam and the Self-Reliance Literary Group (Tự lực Văn 
đoàn). The Francophiles, such as Nguyễn Văn Vĩnh and the Đông 
Dương Magazine [1913-1919] group, Phạm Quỳnh and the Nam Phong 
Magazine [1917-1933] group, Bùi Quang Chiêu, and the Constitutional-
ist Party, also supported the creation of a Western-style constitution in 
Vietnam under the tutelage of the French.108 
 
 102. Id. at 430. 
 103. Id. at 441. 
 104. Id. at 426-37. 
 105. Id. at 428-30. 
 106. Id. at 430 
 107. Id. at 446-50.   
 108.   PHAN ĐĂNG THANH, TƯ TƯỞNG LẬP HIẾN VIỆT NAM NỬA ĐẦU THẾ KỶ 20 
[VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY] 
(Hanoi: Jud. Publ’g House 2006). 
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Despite the forceful call for constitution-making by different ac-
tors, no constitutional documents were enacted in Vietnam before the 
August Revolution of 1945. But the social meaning of the diverse con-
stitutional movements is by no means insignificant. These movements 
familiarized and inspired the Vietnamese people with novel notions of 
Western constitutionalism and helped the public gain full access to the 
ideas and institutions of Western modern constitutionalism. 
2. Hồ Chí Minh’s Constitutionalism 
Hồ Chí Minh is best known as a Vietnamese hero, the founder of 
the Communist Party of Vietnam and the state of Vietnam. He gained a 
status in Vietnam comparable to Mao Zedong in China, however, Hồ 
Chí Minh is different from Mao Zedong in substantial ways. While he 
adopted several ideas of communism such as violent revolution, a revo-
lutionary party, and international connection of the communist commu-
nity as a means to gain the independence for the nation, in order to en-
visage a government in an independent Vietnam, he adopted several 
political schools of thought other than communism, such as classical 
Confucianism and Western modern constitutionalism.109 
For purposes of this paper, Hồ Chí Minh’s adoption of Western 
modern constitutionalism is considered. During the prerevolutionary pe-
riod and early years after the August Revolution of 1945, Hồ Chí Minh 
adopted fundamental ideas of Western liberal constitutionalism in his 
vision of government for the independent Vietnam.110 In this regard, he 
is more similar to Sun Yat-sen than Mao Zedong Consequently, his first 
1946 Constitution shared some values with Sun Yat-sen’s 1946 Consti-
tution and was different from Mao Zedong’s 1954 Constitution. It is 
discernible through the works of Hồ Chí Minh during the given time, 
such as The Ballad on the Demands of Vietnam (1922), Screams to the 
League of Nations (1926), and Declaration of Independence (Septem-
ber, 1945), that he advocated for the Western ideas of the rule of law 
and liberal rights.111 In addition, he insisted in the enactment of a written 
constitution as an instrument not for class struggle in a communist 
sense, but for realization of rule of law and liberal rights in a Western 
 
 109. For more illustrations, see Bui Ngoc Son, Confucianism and Constitutionalism in Vi-
etnam 264-77 (June 2013) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Hong Kong) available at 
http://hub.hku.hk/bitsbitst/10722/197124/2/FullText.pdf [hereinafter Confucianism and Constitu-
tionalism]. 
 110. Thiem H. Bui, Liberal Constitutionalism and the Socialist State in an Era of Globalisa-
tion: An Inquiry into Vietnam’s Constitutional Discourse and Power Structures, 5 THE GLOBAL 
STUDIES J. 47 (2013). 
 111. See generally Id. 
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sense.112 Hồ Chí Minh also denied the Soviet government—the “work-
ers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ government”—in favor of a popular gov-
ernment.113 He accepted the Western idea of a free and equal election, 
and in fact organized such an election after the revolution, which were 
different from the elections in the Soviet Union.114 
Several intellectual and practical factors led Hồ Chí Minh to adopt 
Western liberal constitutional concepts. Two factors should be noted. 
Firstly, his early study of political works by Enlightenment thinkers, 
such as Rousseau and Montesquieu, and his thirty-year overseas experi-
ence, particularly in Western nations such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France where constitutionalism had been devel-
oped, may have shaped his liberal constitutional thinking.115 Secondly, 
the failure of Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviets was the practical factor that may have 
generated Hồ Chí Minh’s conviction that a Soviet government was un-
suitable for Vietnam.116 Although the practice of the Soviet government 
was merely at the village level, its failure brought about a more general 
implication. Thus, the radical proposal of the Soviet government might 
not be appropriate to the revolutionary context in Vietnam in that it 
might exclude the involvement of many strata other than the workers, 
peasants, and soldiers in the revolution. That is why after that abortive 
experience, Hồ Chí Minh and the League for Independence of Vietnam, 
or the Việt Minh front, introduced a commitment to create a democratic 
republic with a popular government in order to rally all forces in the so-
ciety to revolution.117 
 
 112. See generally Id. 
 113. Ngoc Son, supra note 109, at 287. 
 114. Id. at 272.  
 115. Id. at 262-65. 
 116. Two months after its founding, the Communist Party led a peasant insurrection whose 
paroxysm brought about the abolition of the local machinery of government and the replacement 
by the Soviet regime in two provinces, Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh, best known as Xô viết Nghệ- Tĩnh 
(Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviets) (1930-1931). The Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviet revolt lasted many months and then 
was fiercely suppressed by the colonial authorities. The problem of the regime of Nghệ-Tĩnh So-
viets was that, while the members of the Soviets were narrowly limited to the workers and the 
poor peasants, their enemies were broadly defined to include not only the foreign colonialists but 
also a number of strata in the Vietnamese society; the intelligentsia, the rich farmers, and the oth-
er “haves.” This isolated the Soviets from other forces of the society, which enable the colonial-
ists to quell the movement quickly. See Martin Bernal, The Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement 1930-
1931, 92 OXFORD JOURNALS: PAST AND PRESENT 148-68 (1981).  
 117. Ngoc Son, supra note 6, at 269-70. 
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3. The 1946 Constitution 
i. Constitution-making Process 
Immediately following the Declaration of National Independence, 
in the first meeting of the provisional government on September 3, 
1945, Hồ Chí Minh proposed creating a constitution, stating, 
“[p]reviously, because we were ruled by the despotic monarchy and 
then by the equally despotic colonial regime, our country did not have a 
constitution. Our people did not enjoy democratic liberal rights. We 
must have a democratic constitution.”118 In order to enact a constitution, 
he then suggested “organizing as soon as possible a general election in 
concordance with the principle of universal suffrage.”119 
On September 8, 1946, Hồ Chí Minh, the President of the Provi-
sional Government, issued a decree for general suffrage in Vietnam and 
for the convocation of the first National Assembly following general 
election.120 The decree stated, “[t]he Vietnamese people represented by 
the National Assembly are the supreme power to ordain for Vietnam a 
democratic republic constitution;” acknowledging that the people were 
the possessors of the constitutive power and a representative body es-
tablished by popular elections was to make the constitution.121 The de-
cree also provided that in order to draft and propose a constitution to the 
constituent National Assembly, a constitution drafting committee com-
prised of seven members would be established.122 The Constitution 
Drafting Committee was founded on September 20, 1945, and was pre-
sided over by Hồ Chí Minh and six other members.123 The first constitu-
tional draft was presented at the session of the Provisional Government 
on October 24, 1945, and then released to the public in the newspaper 
Cứu Quốc (National Salvation) on November 10, 1945 for public delib-
eration.124 
The National Assembly was created on January 6, 1946, after the 
 
 118. HỒ CHÍ MINH, COMPLETE WORKS VOLUME IV 8 (Hanoi: Nat’l Politics Publ’g House 
2000).  
 119. Id.   
 120. BERNARD B. FALL, THE VIET-MINH REGIME: GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 8 (N.Y.: Inst. of Pac. Relations 1956).  
 121. Decree No. 14/SL (Sept. 8, 1945) (Viet.). 
 122. Id.  
 123. They included including Vĩnh Thụy (formerly monarch Bảo Đại), Vũ Trọng Khánh, Lê 
Văn Hiến, Đặng Thai Mai, Nguyễn Lương Bằng, and Trường Trinh. Decree No. 34/SL (Sept. 20, 
1945) (Viet.).  
 124. PHAN ĐĂNG THANH, TƯ TƯỞNG LẬP HIẾN VIỆT NAM NỬA ĐẦU THẾ KỶ 20 
[VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY] 
(Hanoi: Jud. Publ’g House 2006).  
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general election.125 It was a pluralist constituent assembly, consisting of 
120 delegates of Vietminh (communists), 46 delegates of Democratic 
Party of Vietnam, 24 delegates of Social Party of Vietnam, 143 non-
party delegates, and 70 non-elected delegates of the League of Vietnam 
Revolution (or Việt Cách), and Nationalist Party of Vietnam (or Việt 
Quốc).126 Two months after its founding, the National Assembly, in its 
first session on March 2, 1946, decided to establish its own constitution 
drafting body named “Tiểu ban Hiến pháp” (Select Committee for the 
Constitution), which consisted of 11 members from various political 
parties and a completely different entity from the Provisional Govern-
ment’s Constitution Drafting Committee.127 At the same time, a body of 
the government called the Ủy ban Kiến quốc (Nation Construction 
Committee) introduced another constitutional draft. The Select Commit-
tee for the Constitution, after examining the two drafts by the govern-
ment, referencing foreign constitutions, and taking into account public 
opinion, produced its own draft and presented it in the second session of 
the National Assembly on October 29, 1946.128  This constitutional draft 
was deliberated in the National Assembly for more than one week and 
was eventually approved on November 9, 1946, by a vote of 140 pros 
against 2 cons.129 
 ii.  Contents of the 1946 Constitution 
The 1946 Constitution was not a Soviet-style constitution. Rather, 
it adopted several values of Western liberal constitutionalism. Its pre-
amble recognizes the idea of constituent power held by the people. 
Article 1 defines the polity as a “Democratic Republic” and de-
clares the principle of popular sovereignty: “All powers in the nation 
belong to all Vietnamese people, irrespective of race, gender, prosperi-
ty, class, and religion.”130 
 
 125. Ngoc Son, supra note 109, at 272. 
 126. See generally id. The election was held in hard conditions when internal struggles hap-
pened between communist force and anti-communist forces like Việt Quốc and Việt Cách, and 
the French were returning to Indochina. The Communist Party self-dissolved and transformed to 
the Association of Marxist-Leninist Studies. The communists participated in the election as 
members of Vietminh. Việt Quốc and Việt Cách, anti-communist parties, boycotted the election. 
To appease the internal tension and unify internal force against the returning French, before the 
election, a compromise between Vietminh and Việt Quốc-Việt Cách forces had been reached 
which allowed the later to participate in the National Assembly without election. 
 127. Ngoc Son, supra note 109, at 276. 
 128. Id. at 277. 
 129. Id. 
 130. CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM Nov. 9, 1946, art. I. (Au-
thor’s Translation of 1946 Vietnamese Constitution and hereafter).   
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Next, Chapter II is dedicated to fundamental rights. The Constitu-
tion guaranteed: equal rights in all fields; equality before the law; the 
right to participate in government; gender equality in all domains; rights 
to freedoms of speech, of the press, of association and meeting, of be-
lief, and of movement; and the right to own property.131 In addition, the 
Constitution provided a separate section on political rights concerning 
popular participation (“election, recall and referendum”).132 The Consti-
tution was committed to universal suffrage; free, direct, and secret vot-
ing; the right to recall their representatives; and the right to referendum 
on the Constitution and on important issues concerning the destiny of 
the country.133 
Chapters III through VI of the Constitution deal with the structure 
of the state. The Constitution established a tripartite political system: the 
People’s Parliament, the unicameral legislature elected every three 
years; the Government created by the Parliament, including the Presi-
dent of State, the Vice-President, and the Cabinet with the latter consist-
ing of the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the Vice-Ministers; and the 
judiciary comprising the supreme court, the courts of appeal, and the 
courts of second and first instance.134 The local governments included 
the People’s Councils and the Administrative Committees. 
In structuring the central government, the principle of concentra-
tion rather than separation of power was accepted due to the war condi-
tion.135 It is understood that a concentrated power is more suitable to ral-
ly an entire national force for fighting against the invaders, and to 
deliver political decision quickly in the war context. This leads to the 
connection between the People’s Parliament and the government. 
But, the form of government established by the Constitution was 
more likely a semi-presidential system with the adoption of several fea-
tures of American presidentialism and European parliamentarism, 
which made it distinctive from Soviet-style concentrated government. 
The President of State, albeit selected by the Parliament rather than by 
popular election, had a dual role similar to the President of the United 
States, namely as the head of both the state and the executive branch.136 
 
 131. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 6-14 (1946) (Viet.) 
 132. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 17-21 (1946) (Viet.) 
 133. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 17-21 (1946) (Viet.). 
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 135. NAT’L ASSEMBLY OFFICE, LỊCH SỬ QUỐC HỘI VIỆT NAM (1946-1960) [HISTORY OF 
VIETNAM’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1946-1960)] 104 (Hanoi: Nat’l Politics Publ’g House 1994) 
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(Viet.) (Laws approved by the People’s Parliament must be promulgated by the President of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam no later than 10 days after he receives notification. But within 
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In addition, the president was vested with powerful and independent 
power: to represent the country; to assume the function of Commander-
in-chief of the National Army, nominate or dismiss generals and high-
ranking officers of the Infantry, the Navy, and the Air Force; to sign de-
crees to nominate the Prime Minister, the members of the Cabinet, and 
the high-ranking officials of governmental agencies; to preside over the 
Government Council; to promulgate the laws voted by the People’s Par-
liament; award medals and diplomas of honor; to promulgate special 
amnesties; to sign treaties with other countries; to accredit Vietnamese 
diplomatic representatives abroad and receive diplomatic representa-
tives from other countries; and to declare war and the end of war. The 
President also had the relative veto power – a distinctive form of check 
and balance in the United States presidential system.137 Besides the pres-
idential features, the 1946 Constitution also adopts several features of 
European parliamentarism. A clear example was the parliament-based 
process of government formation. Another parliamentary indicator was 
the institution of vote of no confidence. The distinctive feature of the 
1946 Constitution was that it adopted two separate forms of vote of no 
confidence: the vote on individual ministers and the vote on the collec-
tive Cabinet. This mechanism allows the Parliament to remove both in-
dividual ministers and the Cabinet as a whole.138 
The judiciary is relatively closed to the idea of separation of pow-
ers which underlines the importance of its independence. The Court sys-
tem includes the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal, and the Courts 
of Second and First Instance, organized separately from the central gov-
ernment and local government. Judicial independence was guaranteed 
by the provision that: “The judges must always carry out their judicial 
duties in conformity with the law. No other authority is allowed to inter-
fere with the functions of the Judiciary.”139 
Apart from civil liberties and the semi-presidential government, 
the Constitution also adopts the Western mechanism of the popular con-
stitutional amendment. The final chapter (VII) prescribes the constitu-
tional amendment process as follows: 2/3 majority of the Parliament 
could propose the amendments; a special constitutional amendment 
committee would be established; and the constitutional amendments, af-
 
that term the President shall be entitled to request the People’s Parliament to proceed to a new 
discussion. If the laws are maintained by the People’s Parliament after further discussion, the 
President shall be compelled to promulgate them.), with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
 137. Id. 
 138. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], art. 54 (1946) (Viet.). 
 139. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], art. 69 (1946) (Viet.). 
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ter being approved by the Parliament, would be ratified by the people in 
a popular referendum.140 
With the above contents, some Western experts in Vietnamese 
modern history and particularly Vietnamese constitutional history have 
concluded that the Western democratic features of the 1946 Constitution 
differ from the Soviet constitution. According to David G. Marr, 
“[t]here were a few borrowing from the Soviet constitutional model in 
the [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] text, notably people’s councils 
and administrative committees meant both to serve their constituency 
and to obey directives from above.”141 Instead, the Constitution adopts 
several liberal and democratic values common in Western constitutional 
government. In Mark Sidel’s assessment, “many of the rights enumerat-
ed were intended to indicate the democratic nature of the new govern-
ment and to reach out to other forces in Vietnamese society”142 and the 
provisions on “election, recall and referendum” are “the best evidence 
of the more democratic and participatory nature of the 1946 Constitu-
tion.”143 Bernard B. Fall, an American journalist and analyst, remarks 
that: “The Constitution gives a generally ‘Western democratic’ impres-
sion to the readers in that it does not deal in economics theories and 
does not make use of stereotyped communist phases, such as the ‘work-
ing people’ or the ‘victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ As a 
matter of fact, neither does it resemble the new French Constitution of 
1946, with its detailed social provisions (right to strike, collective bar-
gaining, and creation of an Economic Council). Like the Democratic 
Republic’s Declaration of Independence, it appears designed to provide 
‘reader appeal’ in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and particularly the Unit-
ed States.”144 Inside Vietnam, it is popular to view the 1946 Constitution 
as “a constitution not less democratic and progressive than any constitu-
tion in the world. It is a paradigmatic constitution in many aspects.”145 
In my point of view, the 1946 Constitution reflects fundamental 
ideas and institutions of Western constitutionalism: political pluralism, 
popular sovereignty, constitutional referendum, civil liberties, govern-
mental accountability, some forms of checks and balances, and judicial 
independence. 
 
 140. HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM DAN CHỦ CỘNG HÒA [CONSTITUTION], art. 70 (1946) (Viet.). 
 141. DAVID G. MARR, VIETNAM: STATE, WAR, AND REVOLUTION (1945-146) 106 (Califor-
nia: University of California Press, 2013). 
 142. MARK SIDEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIETNAM 29 (Hart Pub., 2009). 
 143. Id. at 29-30.  
 144. Fall, supra note 120, at 159. 
 145. GIÁO TRÌNH LUẬT HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM [TEXTBOOK ON VIETNAMESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 82 (Hanoi: People’s Polices Publ’g House 1998). 
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The 1946 Constitution’s liberal features may have some connec-
tions with Ho Chi Minh’s liberal constitutional thinking. Inside Vi-
etnam, Ho Chi Minh is normally regarded as the author of the 1946 
Constitution. The world-renowned military commander Võ Nguyên 
Giáp who served in Hồ Chí Minh’s Government, asserts that: “History 
verifies that Hồ Chí Minh is the founder of our Party, our Nation, and 
our National Assembly, and the author of the immortal Declaration of 
Independence and the first Constitution of Vietnam’s Democratic Re-
public.”146 
Hồ Chí Minh in fact played an important role in the birth of the 
1946 Constitution. He suggested constitution-making immediately after 
the national liberation, proposed electing the National Assembly to 
make the constitution, and established the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee under his leadership, which did produce a draft constitution. 
It is very hard to gauge exactly to what extent Hồ Chí Minh’s constitu-
tional ideology actually influenced the drafting of the 1946 Constitu-
tion. However, at least, it can be postulated that Hồ Chí Minh might in-
sert his constitutional ideas in the constitution-making process, 
particularly during the time he served as the leader of the Constitution 
Drafting Committee of the Provisional Government. As the leader of the 
Committee, he might have sketched the basic framework for the future 
constitution of Vietnam. Later, the draft constitution by Hồ Chí Minh’s 
Constitution Drafting Committee became the basis for the work of the 
Collective Committee for Constitution under the National Assembly. 
As a result, the fundamental contents of the 1946 Constitution 
were basically in accordance with Hồ Chí Minh’s constitutional vision. 
The 1946 Constitution was genuinely, to use Hồ Chí Minh’s terminolo-
gies, a “democratic constitution” created in the line with “popular rights 
ideals.”147 The document was the basis to pursue democracy and liberal 
rights rather than the instrument for class struggles. Furthermore, the 
rights provisions in the Constitution were basically in accordance with 
the rights petitions and statements in the 1919 Demands of the Anna-
mite People, the 1926 The Screams to the League of Nations, and the 
September  2, 1945 Declaration of Independence. Finally, the political 
system established by the Constitution meshes well with Hồ Chí Minh’s 
 
 146. VIETNAM’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE, HIẾN PHÁP NĂM 1946 VÀ SỰ KẾ THỪA, 
PHÁT TRIỂN TRONG CÁC HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM [THE 1946 CONSTITUTION AND ITS ENDOWMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE VIETNAM’S CONSTITUTIONS] (Hanoi: National Politics Vietnam Pub-
lishing House 1998). 
 147. Hội Luật Gia [Bar Association], Pháp lý Phục vụ Cách Mạng (Legislations Severving 
Revolution) (Hanoi: Bar Association, 1975), 278. 
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project of a democratic republic with a popular government. That gov-
ernment, instead of a “workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ government,” 
was the government of the entire people, constituted and removable by 
the people through their representatives. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the 1946 Constitution reflects a certain degree Hồ Chí Minh’s liber-
al constitutional thinking. 
However, the liberal features of the 1946 Constitution are also 
closely related to the domestic context in which constitution-making 
was taken place. Although the 1946 Constitution was adopted after a 
communist revolution, it was drafted, deliberated, and adopted by a plu-
ralist national assembly – a constituent assembly. In the words of David 
G. Marr, “the second session of the National Assembly has proved to be 
the most wide-ranging, substantive public deliberation by an official 
body ever to take place in Vietnam to date.”148 The public deliberation 
reflected the views and the choices of political forces other than com-
munism, which advocated more Western-style liberal and democratic 
values.149 The communists constituted only 36% members of the Na-
tional Assembly. Even for the communists, with the experience of the 
Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviets, it is unlikely that the Soviet government model was 
a choice congenial to Vietnam at that time.  Before and after the 1945 
revolution, the central concern of Vietnam was national liberation. 
Therefore, Vietnam needed to rally the resultant force of people for the 
complete liberation of the nation. A communist constitution as an in-
strument for class struggle might have resulted in social division and 
hence was not likely appropriate to the mission of national liberation. A 
democratic constitution which affirmed the power of the entire people, 
established a government of the entire people, and guaranteed basic 
rights for an entire people was more likely to serve as the infrastructure 
for rallying an entire people for national liberation. 
B. Vietnam’s Socialist Constitutions 
The influence of Hồ Chí Minh’s constitutionalism and the consti-
tutionalist spirit of the 1946 Constitution declined from the 1954 libera-
tion to the late twentieth century.150 After the 1946 Constitution, the 
successive socialist constitutions of Vietnam enacted in 1959, 1980, 
 
 148. MARR, supra note 141, at 106-07.  
 149. Id. at 107. 
 150. Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti & Daniel Rockmore, “We the People”: The Global Origins of 
Constitutional Preambles 126 (The University of Chicago Law School Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 664 (2nd Series), 2013), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/664-447-tg-nf-dr-peoples.pdf. 
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1992, and 2013, respectively, follow the Marxist-Leninist constitutional 
ideology to differing levels.151 
The 1959 Constitution, effective in North Vietnam, was promul-
gated after the Điện Biên Phủ victory which put an end to the war 
against the French in 1954.152 After the Điện Biên Phủ victory, the Ge-
neva Conference divided Vietnam into two separate zones, North and 
South, with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ruling in the North 
from Hanoi, and the Republic of Vietnam, under the support of the 
United States, ruling in the South from Sài Gòn (presently, Hồ Chí 
Minh City).153 The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North enact-
ed the second constitution, a charter for implementing socialism in the 
North modeled after the Soviet constitutional system, in December 
1959;154 whereas the Republic of Vietnam in the South enacted its own 
two constitutions in 1956 and 1963 respectively.155 Hồ Chí Minh was 
formally the president of the drafting committee of the 1959 Constitu-
tion, but the document was drafted with the predominant direction by 
the socialists of the Party of Labor (the renamed communist party), par-
ticularly under the influence of the Secretary-General of the Party 
Trường Chinh.156 This explains the radical differences between the 1946 
Constitution and the 1959 Constitution. 
The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 led the nation to unification 
and a new nationwide Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vi-
etnam, the charter for enforcing socialism in all of Vietnam, which was 
promulgated in December 1980.157 The 1980 Constitution faithfully fol-
lowed the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union. 158 
 
 151. See Clauspeter Hill, Vietnam Constitutional Development in a Reunited Country, in 2 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 327, (Clauspeter Hill & Jörg Menzel eds., Singapore: 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2008). 
 152. Id. at 333-34.  
 153. Id. at 330-31, 335. 
 154. On the 1959 Constitution, see Bernard B. Fall, North Vietnam’s Constitution and Gov-
ernment, 34 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 284 (1960). 
 155. For more details, see Robert Devereux, South Vietnam’s New Constitutional Structure, 8 
ASIAN SURV. 627, 628-45 (1968); J. A. C. Grant, The Vietnam Constitution of 1956, 52(2) AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 437, 444-62 (1958); Milton Sacks, Restructuring Government in South Vietnam, 7 
ASIAN SURV. 515 (1967). 
 156. Trường Chinh was the Secretary-General of the prewar Indochina Communist Party and 
became the Secretary-General of the Party of Labor when it was formed in 1951. After the Gene-
va Conference, Trường Chinh resolved to follow Stalin’s example and build socialism in the 
North Vietnam. See WILLIAM WARBEY, HO CHI MINH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN 
INDEPENDENT VIETNAM 117-18 (London: Merlin Press 1972). 
 157. William J. Duiker, The Constitutional System of the Socialist Republic of Vi-
etnam, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 331, 334 (Lawrence 
W. Beer ed., 1992). 
 158. Id. at 336.  
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 In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam initiated an important 
economic reform program known as Đổi mới (Renovation), which was 
meant to transform the centrally planned economy into the socialist-
oriented market economy.159 To meet the new demands of renovating 
the nation, the Constitution of Socialist Republic of Vietnam was adopt-
ed in April 1992. The 1992 Constitution continuously followed the so-
cialist constitutional tradition, but in a more moderate manner, and in-
troduced novel provisions that promoted economic liberalization.160 
The 2013 Constitution was enacted in an attempt to recognize the 
achievements of nearly three decades of renovation and to establish a 
new fundamental framework for future renovation. It further strength-
ened the commitment to human rights protection, but reconfirmed fun-
damental principles of the socialist constitutional order, such as the 
leadership of the Communist Party, the unity of power, and the state’s 
control of the national economy and land, despite the popular call for 
reform during the process of constitution-making.161 
C. The Rise of Restoration Constitutionalism in Vietnam 
The eulogy of Ho Chi Minh’s constitutional thinking and his first 
constitution arose in Vietnam around the late twentieth century.162  It 
was not until the 2010s, however, that the party and state in Vietnam in-
itiated the comprehensive plan for constitutional reform with more lib-
eral and democratic directions and the eulogy shifted to a more practical 
 
 159. Hill, supra note 151, at 338; Tran Thanh Huong & Duong Anh Son, Economic Devel-
opment and Constitutional Reform in Vietnam, in 3 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
311, 312 (Clauspeter Hill & Jörg Menzel eds., Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2009). 
 160. Hill, supra note 149, at 338-54; Huong, supra note 151, at 311-320; Ngô Bá Thành, The 
1992 Constitution and the Rule of Law, in VIETNAM AND THE RULE OF LAW 81-115 (Carlyle A. 
Thayer & David G. Marr eds., Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University 1993); Russell Heng Giang 
Khng, The 1992 Revised Constitution of Vietnam: Background and Scope of Changes, 
14 CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA 221, 223-24 (1992). 
 161. See Bui Ngoc Son, Vietnam’s New Constitution: A Charter for Comprehen-
sive Renovation?, CONSTITUTIONNET, (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/vietnams-new-constitution-charter-comprehensive-
renovation; Bui Ngoc Son, Petition 72: The Struggle for Constitutional Reforms in Vi-
etnam, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/03/petition-
72-the-struggle-for-constitutional-reforms-in-vietnam/. 
 162. VIETNAM’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE, HIẾN PHÁP NĂM 1946 VÀ SỰ KẾ THỪA, 
PHÁT TRIỂN TRONG CÁC HIẾN PHÁP VIỆT NAM [THE 1946 CONSTITUTION AND ITS ENDOWMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE VIETNAM’S CONSTITUTIONS] (Hanoi: National Politics Vietnam Pub-
lishing House 1998); VIETNAM’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE, PHÁT HUY NHỮNG GIÁ TRỊ 
LỊCH SỬ, CHÍNH TRỊ, PHÁP LÝ CỦA HIẾN PHÁP 1946 TRONG SỰ NGHIỆP ĐỔI MỚI HIỆN NAY [THE 
PROMOTION OF HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL VALUES OF THE 1946 CONSTITUTION IN 
THE PRESENT CAUSE OF RENOVATION] (Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House 2009). 
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demand.163 Vietnamese restoration constitutionalists have now no longer 
merely enthusiastically extolled the founding constitutional values. 
Much more than that, they have demanded for the meaningful reifica-
tion of the liberal and democratic values of Ho Chi Minh’s constitution-
al thinking and his 1946 Constitution in the new constitution.164 
Actors in the constitutional restoration movement are varied. Most 
notable among them are retired political leaders and other retired senior 
officials, including Nguyễn Văn An, former President of the National 
Assembly; Nguyễn Đình Lộc, former Minister of Justice; Vũ Mão, for-
mer Chairman of the National Assembly’s Office; and Vũ Đức Khiển, 
former Chairman of the National Assembly’s Legal Committee.165 They 
may have realized the limits of communist leadership and desired more 
liberal reforms during their incumbency, but the party’s discipline might 
have constricted their discourse. Their retirement provides them with 
more space to promote liberal values on the restoration-oriented 
grounds. Other actors include incumbent senior officials like Hà Hùng 
Cường, Minister of Justice; Nguyễn Sỹ Dũng, Vice-Chairman of the 
National Assembly’s Office; and Nguyễn Văn Phúc, Vice-Chairman of 
the National Assembly’s Economic Committee. Some liberal assembly 
delegates, such as Dương Trung Quốc and Nguyễn Minh Thuyết, have 
also joined the restoration movement. Notably, the restoration constitu-
tionalists include a number of distinguished legal scholars, such as Lê 
Cảm, Nguyễn Đăng Dung, Phạm Duy Nghĩa, Nguyễn Như Phát, 
Nguyễn Cửu Việt, and Đào Trí Úc;166 intellectuals in different fields; 
ordinary people; and even dissidents. The main venues for expressing 
the restoration proposals consist of the congressional forum, popular fo-
rums (state-owned popular medias, unofficial websites, and Facebook), 
and scholarly forums (national law journals and conferences, work-
shops, and seminars). 
The restoration movement has been vehement since the Vietnam-
net – the most popular state-owned online media company in Vietnam – 
published an interview with Nguyễn Văn An in June 16, 2010. In the 
interview, An passionately called for return to fundamental principles of 
the 1946 Constitution.167 After identifying the limits of recent constitu-
tional amendments in Vietnam, An states that: “I believe that recent 
 
 163. Ha, supra note 7.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Nguyen Thi Huong, Pursuing Constitutional Dialogue within Socialist Vietnam: The 
2010 Debate, 13 Austl. J.L. 1, 8-11 (2012). 
 166. Id. at 11. 
 167. Ha, supra note 7. 
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constitutional amendments have some points which depart from or are 
less transparent compared with the 1946 Constitution – the first Consti-
tution of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. I believe that recent consti-
tutional amendments have some points which depart from or less trans-
parent compared with the 1946 Constitution – the first constitution of 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”168 He then argues for constitutional 
reforms on the grounds of the 1946 charter.169 In fact, Nguyễn Văn An’s 
restorationism, more than the expression of his personal constitutional 
wisdom, reflected and popularized the restoration movement, which had 
been promoted by legal scholars and intellectuals, thanks to An’s former 
legislative leadership and the publication in the most popular online 
media company in the nation.170 
In addition to Nguyễn Văn An’s interview, Vietnamnet conducted 
another interview with Nguyễn Đình Lộc in late 2010.171 Quite similar 
to An, Lộc followed the same restoration trend. He believes that the 
1946 Constitution is paradigmatic in the sense that it includes all neces-
sary fundamental rights.172 However, Lộc’s concern was conceptual ra-
ther than institutional, and hence he is more interested in Ho Chi Minh’s 
constitutionalism than the 1946 charter. He stated, “In order to amend 
the Constitution, we have to change or determine more clearly our doc-
trine of constitution, state power, and liberal rights of the people. On the 
ground of that doctrine, we can design institutions.”173 He proposed a 
return to Ho Chi Minh’s “constitutional doctrine:” 
Uncle Hồ’s aspiration is very clear. He also publicly de-
clared his aspiration as follows: ‘We must have a democratic 
constitution’ . . . The meaning of the word ‘democratic’ is very 
rich. It is expressed in the 1946 Constitution. Certainly, we 
should not extol the 1946 Constitution unilaterally. It is not 
simple to apply the 1946 Constitution in the current situation. 
Uncle Hồ’s constitutional doctrine is very clear. We have to 
follow Hồ Chí Minh ‘s thought, and the case is how to apply 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See generally id.  
 171. The interview includes two parts. Tuần Việt Nam, Đã đến lúc không thể tránh né những 
vấn đề cốt tử [It is now Impossible to Avoid Essential Issues], TUAN VIETNAM.NET (Sept. 9, 
2010, 7:00), http://tuanvietnam.net/2010-09-02-da-den-luc-khong-the-tranh-ne-nhung-van-de-cot-
tu-; Tuần Việt Nam, Việc nước mà dân không biết thì không thể dân chủ được [If the People are 
not Aware of National Affairs, It will be Undemocratic], TUAN VIETNAM.NET (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://tuanvietnam.net/2010-09-02-trang-page. 
 172. Tuần Việt Nam, supra 171. 
 173. Id. 
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them.174 
Nguyễn Văn An and Nguyễn Đình Lộc’s interviews have particu-
larly contributed to the development of Vietnamese restoration constitu-
tionalism. After these interviews, Vietnamese legal scholars, intellectu-
als, officials, and others are more confident in their struggle for 
restoring the values of the 1946 Constitution and Hồ Chí Minh’s consti-
tutional thought. It is useful to illustrate this by some restoration state-
ments. Lê Cảm, a distinguished law professor at Vietnam National Uni-
versity at Hanoi, in an article published in Người đại biểu nhân dân 
(People’s Representatives), a popular newspaper of the National As-
sembly, ardently calls for “amending the 1992 Constitution under the 
light of Hồ Chí Minh’s thought.”175 He proposes that three features, 
namely “people,” “democracy,” and “rule of law,” which in his belief, 
are the essential components of Hồ Chí Minh’s constitutional thought 
and are embodied in the 1946 Constitution, must be followed in course 
of constitutional revision.176 In the same vein, Đinh Dũng Sỹ, a scholar-
official of the Government’s Office, in an article published by the Na-
tional Assembly’s Journal of Legislative Studies, suggests that Vietnam 
“can completely reform the 1992 Constitution by developing the notions 
of the 1946 Constitution suitable to the current situation.”177 Nguyễn Sĩ 
Dũng holds the same view, stating in the Tia Sáng Newspaper that: “to 
amend the 1992 Constitution pertaining the rule of law state and the 
methods of constitutional writing, we need not learn from elsewhere but 
learn from the 1946 Constitution.” 178 Let us consider in detail the resto-
ration constitutional proposals. 
1. Popular Sovereignty 
The restoration constitutionalists call for redefinition of the princi-
ple of popular sovereignty on the grounds of Hồ Chí Minh’s thought 
 
 174. Id.   
 175. Lê Văn Cảm, Sửa đổi Hiến pháp năm 1992 dưới ánh sáng tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh 
[Amending the 1992 Constitution under the Light of Hồ Chí Minh’s Thought], ĐẠI BIỂU NHÂN 
DÂN (Sep. 17, 2011), 
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 177. Đinh Dũng Sỹ, Một số đề xuất sửa đổi, bổ sung phần liên quan đến chương I - Hiến 
pháp năm 1992 [Some Suggestions for Amending the Chapter I of the 1992 Constitution], 
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 178. Nguyễn Sĩ Dũng, Học ở Hiến pháp năm 1946 [Learning from the 1946 Constitution], 
TIASÁNG (Sep. 16, 2011, 9:40), 
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and the 1946 Constitution. They challenge the Marxist class definition 
of “the people” in the Article 2 of the 1992 Constitution which defines 
the foundation of the people as “the alliance between the working class 
and the peasantry and the intelligentsia.”179 For example, Vũ Đức Khiển 
summons Hồ Chí Minh’s concept of “great national solidarity” (đại 
đoàn kết dân tộc) to argue against the class foundation of the people.180 
He states that the Vietnamese people are all patriots irrespective of 
class.181 Moreover, he believes the nation is stable and perennial while 
the components of classes are changeable.182 In addition, he criticizes 
that the class definition of the people fails to recognize the emerging 
role of the rising entrepreneurs in contemporary Vietnam.183 On these 
grounds, Vũ Đức Khiển calls for reestablishing the “great national soli-
darity” as the foundation of the people.184 Meanwhile, other restoration 
constitutionalists, such as Đào Trí Úc – a well-known legal scholar in 
Vietnam – invoke Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution to propose redefin-
ing popular sovereignty as that all state powers belong to the entire peo-
ple regardless of class.185 
2. Constitutional Referendum 
Another corollary of the restoration-orientated reconceptualization 
of the meaning of popular sovereignty pertains to constituent power. 
The restoration constitutionalists argue that to truly practice the princi-
ple of popular sovereignty, the constituent power must belong to the 
people, and the provisions of the 1946 Constitution regarding constitu-
tional referendum are invoked to justify that argument.186 
In this concern, the most vehement voice perhaps comes from 
Nguyễn Văn An expressed in the aforementioned interview. After re-
 
 179. 1992 CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Apr. 25, 1992, art. 2. 
 180. Vũ Đức Khiển, Sửa đổi, Bổ sung Điều 2 và Điều 6 Hiến pháp Hiện hành để Bảo đảm 
Nguyên tắc Tất cả Quyền lực Nhà nước Thuộc về Nhân dân [Amending Article 2 and Article 6 of 
the current Constitution to ensure the Principle that All State Powers Belong to the People], 7 J. 




 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Đào Trí Úc & Đinh Phượng Quỳnh, “Chế định Chủ quyền Nhân dân và Việc Sửa đổi 
Hiến pháp 1992” [The Institution of Popular Sovereignty and Amending the 1992 Constitution], 
Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (2012): 3-6. For the same view, see Đinh Dũng Sỹ, [Some Sug-
gestions for Amending the Chapter I of the 1992 Constitution], 6. 
 186. Id. 
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viewing articles 21, 32, and 70 of the 1946 Constitution which affirm 
the people’s right to ratify the constitution through national referendum, 
An argues that the 1946 Constitution recognizes that the people are the 
author of the constituent power.187 He then demonstrates that three later 
constitutions transfer the constituent power from the people to the Na-
tional Assembly.188 
Notably, An critically questions: “Who has the right to decide on 
that transferring? The explicit answer is that only the people can have 
that right. But there is not any document indicating that the people have 
transferred the constituent power to the National Assembly, but it is the 
National Assembly who self-decides to transfer the constituent power to 
it.”189 He reasons that only when the people possess the constituent 
power by which they decide the political system of the nation and au-
thorize powers to political institutions to rule the nation on behalf of the 
people - the authentic sovereign of the nation.190 He states that the trans-
ferring of the constituent power from the people to the National Assem-
bly by the self-decision of the National Assembly has substantially 
changed the authentic sovereign from the people to the National As-
sembly.191 The actual implication is that the Vietnamese people are no 
longer the authentic sovereign of the nation, and the National Assembly 
appropriates the constituent power from the people and becomes an il-
legitimate sovereign. More seriously, this calls into question the consti-
tutional legitimacy of political leadership in Vietnam generally. To re-
solve the legitimacy problem, Nguyễn Văn An mobilizes for returning 
sovereignty to the people by restoring the 1946 Constitution’s provi-
sions of constitutional referendum.192 He proposes that the revised Con-
stitution must restore the people’s right to referendum in accordance 
with the provisions of the 1946 Constitution in the sense that the right 
must be recognized in the new constitution, and more importantly, the 
new constitution itself must be ratified by the people in a national plebi-
scite before it can enter into effect.193 
Inspired by Nguyễn Văn An’s interview, numerous intellectuals 
have argued for popular authorship of the constituent power and consti-
 
 187. Tuần Việt Nam, supra note171. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Thu Hà, Cựu chủ tịch Quốc hội bàn chuyện sửa Hiến pháp [Ex-president of the National 
Assembly Commenting on Constitutional Amendment], TuanVietnam.net, (June 16, 2010), 
http://community.tuanvietnam.net/2010-06-24-cuu-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-ban-viec-sua-hien-phap. 
 190. Ha, supra, note 7. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 8. 
 193. Id.  
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tutional referendum on the grounds of the 1946 Constitution. Invoking 
the founding generation, they have strongly suggested that the new con-
stitution must recognize in its preamble the people as the author to or-
dain the Constitution, eliminate the constitution making power of the 
National Assembly, establish referendum as mandatory in the constitu-
tion making procedure, and the new constitution itself must be popular-
ly ratified.194 
A more moderate approach agrees on the restoration of the provi-
sion of constitutional referendum in the new constitution but suggests 
that this provision will be applied to the next constitutional amendment. 
In this regard, consider the discussion by Hà Hùng Cường at the meet-
ing of the National Assembly when the body debated on the draft re-
vised constitution on November 16, 2012. Equally summoning Hồ Chí 
Minh and the 1946 Constitution, Cường agreed on the idea of popular 
authorship of the constituent power and the reinsertion of the people’s 
right to referendum in the new Constitution.195 He further underlined 
that only when the people possess the definitive power to make and 
amend the constitution is the constitution truly the expression of “the 
spirit of rule of law” according to Hồ Chí Minh’s aspiration.196 But, in 
the concern that sufficient time is necessary to prepare for constitutional 
referendum and especially to counter against the possible subversive ac-
tions of the dissidents, Cường submitted that the referendum should be 
practiced in the next turn of constitutional amendment.197 
3. Change of the Nation’s Name 
As a serious consequence of the more democratic reconceptualiza-
tion of the sovereignty and the constitution, the restoration constitution-
alists even invoke Hồ Chí Minh and the 1946 Constitution to propose 
restoring the nation’s name, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in re-
 
 194. Đào Trí Úc & Đinh Phượng Quỳnh,supra note 185; Nguyễn Minh Đoan, Việc Thể hiện 
Chủ quyền nhân dân trong Hiến pháp [The Expression of Popular Sovereignty in the Constitu-
tion], 22 Journal of Legislative Studies, 3-8 (2012).; Nguyễn Cửu Việt, Bàn thêm về Vấn đề Sửa 
đổi Hiến pháp 1992 nhìn từ Nguyên tắc Chủ quyền Nhân dân [Further Discussion on Amending 
the 1992 Constitution From the Perspective of the Principle of Popular Sovereignty], 18 Journal 
of Legislative Studies 3-13 (2012). Lê Văn Cảm & Vũ Văn Huân, Hiến pháp với việc Tổ chức Bộ 
máy Quyền lực Nhà nước Trong Giai đoạn Xây dựng Nhà nước Pháp quyền Việt Nam [The Con-
stitution and the Organization of State Power in the Period of Building the Rule of Law State in 
Vietnam] 1-2 Journal of Legislative Studies 26-33 (2012).   
 195. Dân phải được Quyền Phúc quyết Hiến pháp [The People Must Have the Right to Vote 
on the Constitution], VIETNAM NET (Nov. 17, 2012), http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-tri/97283/dan-
phai-duoc-quyen-phuc-quyet-hien-phap.html 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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placement of the current name, Socialist Republic of Vietnam. To illus-
trate, Lê Cảm calls for “returning the deeply meaningful name of our 
nation on which Uncle Hồ has ruminated before using it in the 1946 
Constitution.”198 Others turn to Hồ Chí Minh’s Declaration of Inde-
pendence to hold the same view.199 
The movement of restoring the founding name, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, was particularly vehement during the period of 
public consultation of the draft revised Constitution from January to 
March 2013, which was mobilized by numerous intellectuals in differ-
ent fields and ordinary people.200 As a consequence, the Constitutional 
Amendment Committee had planned to submit to the National Assem-
bly’s Standing Committee the alternative of renaming the nation as 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam according to the public suggestion,201 
but the plan was soon abandoned by the political leadership. 
This notwithstanding, the restoration constitutionalists persisted in 
calling for a return to the founding nation’s name. Consider first the dis-
course of Dương Trung Quốc. He reveals that Ho Chi Minh was a 
communist and experienced in the Soviet regimes, but chose the regime 
of a democratic republic for understandable reasons.202 Quốc explains 
that Hồ Chí Minh’s rational opinion of a democratic republic stems 
from his internalization of Easternized American political thoughts and 
Sun Yat Sen’s Three People’s Principles or San-min Doctrine.203 Quốc 
underlines: “These are the great political achievements of the mankind 
and Uncle chose the most progressive [political] model at that time.”204 
He then demonstrates that the political model of a democratic republic 
 
 198. Lê Cảm, Các Quy phạm Hiến định về Hệ thống Viện kiểm sát Nhân dân trong Giai đoạn 
Xây dựng Nhà nước Pháp quyền [The Constitutional Provisions on the System of People’s Procu-
cracies in the Period of Building the Rule of Law State], 2 TẠP CHÍ KIỂM SÁT [JOURNAL OF 
PROCURACY] 21 (2011).  
 199. See, e.g., Lê Quốc Hùng, Hiến pháp Cần Gắn Hơn nữa với Tuyên ngôn Độc lập [The 
Constiution Should further Adhere to the Declaration of Independence], 17 J. OF LEGIS. STUDIES 
7-10 (2012).  
 200. Timeline of the Constitutional Amendment in Vietnam, VIETNAMESE REDEMPTORISTS’ 
NEWS (May 2, 2013), http://www.vrnews.org/2013/05/timeline-of-constitutional-amendment-
in.html. 
 201. See generally Constitutional Amendment Committee, BÁO CÁO VỀ VIỆC GIẢI 
TRÌNH, TIẾP THU, CHỈNH LÝ DỰ THẢO SỬA ĐỔI HIẾN PHÁP NĂM 1992 TRÊN CƠ SỞ 
Ý KIẾN NHÂN DÂN [REPORT, AND EXPLAINING, RECEIVING, EDITING THE DRAFT REVISED 
1992 CONSTITUTION ON THE GROUND OF PEOPLE’S OPINIONS] (May. 17, 2013).  
 202. Dương Trung Quốc, Đổi lại tên Nước không phải là một Bước Thụt lùi, [Renaming the 
Nation is not a Back-looking Step], TINNGAN (Apr. 25, 2013), http://tinngan.vn/Doi-lai-ten-nuoc-
khong-phai-la-buoc-lui_1-0-398567.html 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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was embodied in Hồ Chí Minh’s Declaration of Independence and the 
1946 Constitution.205 Quốc eventually advocates the restoration of the 
name Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a return to “a stable founda-
tion constructed on the ground of a political doctrine which has been 
experienced and verified.”206 Such a return to Quốc is not back-looking, 
but “a chance to change.”207 
In quite a similar vein, Vũ Mão highly concurs with a return to the 
name Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and particularly underlines that 
such a return is truly accordant with the popular aspiration.208 He offers 
fives rationales for that return. First, the name Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam truly reflects the reality of Vietnam at the present time in the 
sense that socialism has not yet been achieved in Vietnam.209 Second, 
the Party always holds a practical point of view.210 Third, Hồ Chí Minh 
created the name which was affirmed by the 1946 Constitution and 
1959 Constitution, and the return to it means a profound respect to Hồ 
Chí Minh’s perspective.211 Fourth, the return to the name will gain the 
support of the Vietnamese expatriates, which is instrumental to consoli-
dating the “great national solidarity.”212 Fifth, there is virtually no nation 
in the world whose name is given with the “socialist” component, in-
cluding China.213 
4. Multi-Party System 
One of the most controversial issues in Vietnamese constitutional 
debate is the constitutional confirmation of the predominant leadership 
of the Communist Party. Some restoration constitutionalists have in-
voked Ho Chi Minh and the 1946 Constitution to attack that confirma-
tion, implicitly or explicitly calling for pluralist politics in Vietnam. 
Consider, for example, the discussion in early 2013 by Dương Trung 
Quốc in his article published by Báo Lao Động (Labor Newspaper) in 
the midst of a popular consultation on the draft new constitution in.214 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.   
 208. Vũ Mão, Tên nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa sẽ Tạo thế Đi lên, [The Nation’s Name 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam will Create the Proceeding Movement], DAN TRI (Apr. 16, 
2013), http://dantri.com.vn/xa-hoi/ten-nuoc-viet-nam-dan-chu-cong-hoa-se-tao-the-di-len-
719932.htm. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.   
 214. Dương Trung Quốc, Nghĩ vào lúc đang Sửa đổi [Reflections in the midst of Constitu-
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Quốc restates that during the period of creation of the first National As-
sembly – the constituent assembly and drafting of the first Constitution 
– there was no single-party system in Vietnam, the Indochina Com-
munist Party had self-dissolved, and Communist representatives in the 
Assembly were just members of “[t]he Association of Marxist-Leninist 
Studies.”215 Quốc underlines that Ho Chi Minh initiated a form of “plu-
ralism and multi-party” (đa nguyên, đa đảng) by inviting 70 members 
from Việt Quốc and Việt Cách to participate in the National Assembly 
who had boycotted the election.216 Restating the fact that the 1946 Con-
stitution was drafted by a multi-party constituent assembly, Quốc has 
implicitly challenged the entrenchment of leadership of the Communist 
Party in the Constitution. 
The challenge to the Party’s leadership is more explicit in the res-
toration discourse by the dissidents in unofficial venues. To illustrate, in 
an article titled “The Communist Party of Vietnam must return the 1946 
Constitution for the nation” published in his personal blog and then dis-
seminated in other unofficial websites, Lê Quốc Quân – a Vietnamese 
dissident lawyer – explicitly calls for pluralism and a multi-party sys-
tem, stating that “[t]he basic spirit of the first pluralist constitution 
(1946) must be respected and entirely restored. The Communist Party 
who has taken hostage it and kept it in captivity now must release and 
return it to the nation.”217 
5. Semi-Presidentialism 
The 1992 Constitution establishes a socialist version of parliamen-
tarianism in which the National Assembly is the supreme body vested 
with formal powerful authorities, and the State President and the Gov-
ernment are subordinate to it. 218 The State President is accorded sym-
bolic authorities.219 The restoration constitutionalists have summoned 
the 1946 Constitution to propose the change of the form of government, 
especially in the lines of semi-presidentialism.220 Nguyễn Văn An’s 
 
tional Revision], LAO DONG (Jan. 20, 2013), http://laodong.com.vn/lao-dong-cuoi-tuan/nghi-vao-
luc-hien-phap-dang-sua-doi-99644.bld.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Lê Quốc Quân, Đảng CSVN hãy trả lại Hiến Pháp 1946 cho dân tộc! [The Communist 
Party of Vietnam Must Return the 1946 Constitution to the Nation], DAN LUAN (Oct 2, 2011), 
http://www.danluan.org/tin-tuc/20111001/le-quoc-quan-dang-csvn-hay-tra-lai-hien-phap-1946-
cho-dan-toc.  
 218. Vietnam Const. of 1992, art. 6. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Nguyễn Thị Hương, Học ở Hiến pháp 1946: Cần Nhìn nhận cả Ưu điểm và Hạn chế, 
[Learning From the 1946 Constitution: It is Necessary To Realize its Strong Points and Weak 
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constitutional commentary should be examined again.221 He insisted that 
a head of state must possess three powers, namely, to act on behalf of 
the state in domestic and foreign affairs, to assume command of the 
armed forces, and to preside over the executive.222 He demonstrated that 
in contemporary Vietnam these powers are diffused into three different 
institutions, namely the State President, the General Secretary of the 
Party, and the Prime Minister, respectively.223 He explicitly expressed 
his worry about the peril of this diffusion but did not explain in details, 
perhaps because of politically sensitive reasons.224 He then invoked the 
relevant provisions of the 1946 Constitution pertaining to the powers of 
the State President225 to propose a semi-presidential paradigm with the 
concentration of the three powers in a single president.226 
The suggestions of a more powerful presidency on the grounds of 
the 1946 Constitution were also evident during the time of public debate 
on the draft revised Constitution in early 2013. Citing relevant provi-
sions of the 1946 charter, the restoration constitutionalists submitted 
different proposals to enhance the powers of the State President, such as 
the powers to preside over the meetings of the Government and to veto 
the laws made by the legislature.227 Some also invoke the reality that Ho 
Chi Minh used to be the head of both the State and the Party to suggest 
integrating the presidency with the position of General Secretary of the 
Party.228 By the time these contentious discussions occurred, rumor had 
it that there was an internal strife between the State President and the 
Prime Minister. Yet, it would be a risk to rely on that anecdotal evi-
dence. Whether the restoration-oriented proposal of a more powerful 
 
Points], TiaSang (Dec. 12, 2011, 3:41 AM), 
http://tiasang.com.vn/Default.aspx?tabid=116&CategoryID=42&News=4708.; 
Mai Thái Lĩnh, Những Khuyết điểm Nghiêm trọng của Hiến pháp 1946 [Serious Deflects of the 
1946 Constitution], PRO ARTNOC (July 13, 2012), http://www.procontra.asia/?p=743. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Thu Hà, Cựu chủ tịch Quốc hội bàn chuyện sửa Hiến pháp [Ex-president of the National 
Assembly Commenting on Constitutional Amendment], TUANVIETNAM.NET, (June 16, 2010), 
http://community.tuanvietnam.net/2010-06-24-cuu-chu-tich-quoc-hoi-ban-viec-sua-hien-phap. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Nov. 9, 1946, arts. 45, 49. 
 226. Hà, supra note 7. 
 227. Thứ Bẩy, Bàn luận sôi nổi về Tăng Quyền hạn của Chủ Tịch nước [Forceful Discussions 
on Strengthening the Powers of The President of the State], DAN TRI, (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://dantri.com.vn/chinh-tri/ban-luan-soi-noi-ve-tang-quyen-han-cua-chu-tich-nuoc-684275.htm 
 228. Thứ Bẩy, Bàn luận sôi nổi về Tăng Quyền hạn của Chủ Tịch nước [Forceful Discussions 
on Strengthening the Powers of The President of the State], DAN TRI, (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://dantri.com.vn/chinh-tri/ban-luan-soi-noi-ve-tang-quyen-han-cua-chu-tich-nuoc-
684275.htm. 
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presidency means to react to the reality of a political battle remains a 
mystery. 
6. Liberal Rights 
The restoration constitutionalists also propose a redefinition of lib-
eral rights on the grounds of the 1946 Constitution. They criticize citi-
zens’ rights provided in the 1992 Constitution as the statist rights, the 
rights paternally bestowed to the citizens by the state and subject to ar-
bitrary withdrawal, citing the phrase “in accordance to the law” appear-
ing in most constitutional right provisions.229 Invoking the rights provi-
sions in the 1946 Constitution, which excludes such expression, they 
then suggest a redefinition of human rights as natural rights in the man-
ner similar to the 1946 charter, which shall establish limitations on the 
state power.230 
Some restoration constitutionalists invoke particular provisions in 
the 1946 Constitution to petition for particular rights. Some focus on the 
restoration of several political rights, such as the people’s right to re-
move their representatives from office.231 But more attention has been 
given to the restoration of the 1946 Constitution’s provisions on eco-
nomic rights. During public debate on the constitutional revision, the 
call for restraint of the state’s powers over land, the economy, the 
recognition of private ownership of land, and the protection of private 
economic sector has been vehement, and the 1946 Constitution has been 
normally cited for justification. Vũ Mão, for example, extols the 1946 
 
 229. Nguyễn Sĩ Dũng, [“Learning from the 1946 Constitution”]; Thanh Lưu, Hiến pháp 
không phải để Ban ơn cho Nhân dân [The Constitution is not Designed to Bestow to the People], 
PHÁPLUẬT (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:50 AM), http://phapluattp.vn/20120902111641122p0c1013/hien-
phap-khong-phai-de-ban-on-cho-nhan-dan.htm (Law Newspaper’s Interview with Nguyễn Như 
Phát, Director of the State and Law Institute). 
 230. Id.; Nguyễn Đăng Dung & Bùi Tiến Đạt, Cải cách Chế định Quyền và Nghĩa vụ Cơ bản 
của Công dân trong Hiến pháp 1992 Theo Nguyên Tắc Tôn trọng Quyền Con người [Reforming 
the Provisions Concerning Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens in the 1992 Constitution in 
Accordance with the Principle of Respecting Human Rights] in SỬA ĐỔI BỔ SUNG HIẾN PHÁP 
1992: NHỮNG VẤN ĐỀ LÝ LUẬN VÀ THỰC TIỄN, TẬP II [AMENDING THE 1992 CONSTITUTION: 
PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES, VOLUME II] 14-25 (Hanoi: Hông Đức Publishing House 
2012); Vũ Công Giao, Quyền con người, Quyền công dân Trong Hiến pháp trên Thế giới và Hiến 
pháp Việt Nam: Sơ bộ Phân tích So sánh [Human Rights and Citizen’s Rights in the Constitutions 
of the World and in the Constitutions of Vietnam: Comparative Analysis] in SỬA ĐỔI BỔ SUNG 
HIẾN PHÁP 1992: NHỮNG VẤN ĐỀ LÝ LUẬN VÀ THỰC TIỄN, TẬP II [AMENDING THE 1992 
CONSTITUTION: PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES, VOLUME II] 26-57 (Hanoi: Hông Đức 
Publishing House 2012). 
 231. Ngoc Quang, Kiến Nghị Bổ sung Một số Vấn đề trong Bãi miễn Đại biểu Quốc hội 
[Recommendations on the Removal from Office the Assembly Delegates], GIAODUC VIET NAM, 
(Mar. 2, 2013), http://giaoduc.net.vn/Xa-hoi/Kien-nghi-bo-sung-mot-so-van-de-trong-viec-bai-
nhiem-Dai-bieu-Quoc-hoi-post111866.gd.  
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Constitution’s support of multi-ownership of land, implicitly challeng-
ing the current land ownership system which includes the state’s pre-
rogative powers over land and excludes private land ownership.232 A 
more explicit petition for private land ownership on the grounds of the 
1946 Constitution can be found in a popular article by Đặng Hùng Võ – 
an expert in land issues and former Vice-Minister of Natural Resources 
and the Environment.233 Others cite the 1946 Constitution’s guarantee of 
the right to private property, which shall not be nationalized, and the 
right to do business to argue for more constitutional protection of pri-
vate economic sectors.234 
7. Independent Judiciary 
Closely related to human rights protection is an independent judi-
ciary. In this regard, the restoration constitutionalists call for a return to 
the court system established by the 1946 Constitution and several de-
crees of President Ho Chi Minh,235 which consisted of the Supreme 
Court, the courts of appeal, and primary and secondary courts organized 
independently from the administrative units and local governments.236 
Note that the name of these courts did not include a reference of “peo-
ple” as latter.237 
The court system established by the 1992 Constitution consists of 
the People’s Supreme Court, the local people’s courts in each adminis-
trative level, and the military courts.238 The problem is that the local 
courts are organized parallel to the local administrative levels, giving 
rise to the interference of the local governors and local party leaders in 
judicial adjudications.239 To handle this problem, the restoration consti-
tutionalists have mobilized for a return to the past judicial experience. 
 
 232. Vũ Mão, Cần trở lại Tinh thần Hiến pháp 1946 [It is Necessary to return to the Spirit of 
the 1946 Constitution], VIETNAM.NET, (Feb. 6, 2013), http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-
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 233. Đặng Hùng Võ, Sở hữu Tư nhân về Đất đai là Tất yếu [Private Land Property is Natu-
ral], BAUXITE VIET NAM, (Mar. 22, 2011), http://boxitvn.blogspot.com/2011/03/so-huu-tu-
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the Highest Judicial Body], PHAPLUAT (Jan. 29, 2012, 12:17 AM), 
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 239. See MARK SIDEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIETNAM 177-78 (2009). 
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For instance, making reference to the court system of the founding peri-
od, Đinh Văn Quế, a legal scholar and a judge of the Supreme People’s 
Court, suggests that: “The structure and names of these courts still re-
main its values, profoundly expressing Ho Chi Minh’s thought of rule 
of law state. Therefore, in reforming its organization and activity, the 
judiciary should retain this wise thought of the Man.”240 
D. Factors, Limited Effects, and Prospects of Vietnamese Restoration 
Constitutionalism 
1. Factors 
The discourse of restoration constitutionalism has emerged as an 
intellectual resistance to Vietnamese socialism. Restoration-oriented 
constitutional discourse sharply contradicts the socialist constitutional 
dogmas which have dominated Vietnam for many decades: popular vs. 
class-based sovereignty, popular vs. legislative constitution-making, 
democratic vs. socialist republic, multi-party vs. single party system, 
semi-presidentialism vs. socialist parliamentarism, natural vs. statist 
rights, and independent vs. controlled judiciary, respectively.241 
The limits of the socialist constitutional order are the cause of the 
emergence of the rivaling restoration constitutional thinking. Several 
decades of implementation of the renovation program initiated in 1986 
have resulted in economic and social transitions in Vietnam, which has 
in turn demanded corresponding institutional changes.242 Meanwhile, 
the authoritarian institutions that Vietnam borrowed from the Soviet 
tradition proved to be inappropriate to the new context of development 
of the market economy in an era of globalization.243 Hence, Vietnam has 
been urged to reform the constitutional institutions in line with interna-
tional standards of a constitutionalist state, to a certain extent, to make 
the institutions fit with the new transitional context of the nation, and to 
make them not look like a “fish out of water” in the world.244 This re-
sulted in the plan to comprehensively revise the nation’s constitution in 
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the 2010s. 
What is the intellectual base for constitutional revision? In this re-
gard, consider the discussion by Nguyễn Đình Lộc: “in order to amend 
the Constitution, we have to change or determine more clearly our doc-
trine of constitution, state power, and liberal rights of the people. On the 
ground of that doctrine, we can design institutions.”245 The call for new 
constitutional thinking in the course of constitutional revision implies 
the failure of the current socialist constitutional ideology. It is unlikely 
that solutions for topical constitutional questions like, a democratic and 
accountable government, the rule of law, separation of powers, and ju-
dicial independence,246 which are generated by the internal social and 
economic renovation and the external impact of globalization, can be 
found in the conventional Marxist-Leninist dogmas like the “class na-
ture” of state and constitution, “democratic centralism,” and “socialist 
legalism.”247 Instead, more liberal constitutional experience prior to the 
triumph of socialist constitutions provides compelling intellectual 
sources. 
In addition, the social attraction to restoration constitutionalism in 
Vietnam is motivated by the aspiration of past-oriented transition to 
universalistic constitutionalism as opposed to exclusive socialist consti-
tutional order. The Vietnamese restoration constitutionalists conceive 
the 1946 Constitution as a great achievement of the nation in that it in-
cludes universal constitutionalist values discovered and contextualized 
in Vietnam by the founding generation. To illustrate, Nguyễn Như Phát 
– Director of the Institute of State and Law – proudly states: “This first 
Constitution presents very progressive values, logical thinking, and pro-
gressive notions of modern constitutionalism.”248 Similarly, Nguyễn Sỹ 
Dũng concludes that: “The 1946 Constitution is a great heritage of con-
stitutional intellectual and culture of our nation. This heritage will for-
ever illuminate our heart and brain in the process of building a rule of 
law state and an equal, democratic, and civilized society.”249 Some at-
tribute the universal merit of the 1946 Constitution to Ho Chi Minh’s 
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perspicacity.250 For instance, Vũ Mão, in his petition to return to the 
1946 Constitution, explains that Ho Chi Minh has studied the “East and 
West, now and then” using thoughts and knowledge to create a constitu-
tion presenting “convergence” with the general trend of civilization, dif-
ferent from the later 1959 Constitution that was influenced by the “old-
style socialist movement.”251 The 1946 Constitution in fact contains 
some universal norms of standard constitutionalism, namely popular 
sovereignty, popular authorship of the constituent power, separation of 
powers and some forms of checks and balances, liberal rights, and judi-
cial independence. The Vietnamese constitutional reformers seek to re-
apply these universal norms as alternative to the dominant socialist con-
stitutional dogmas.252 Past constitutional thought and design has served 
as legitimation and justification for the call for universalistic constitu-
tionalism. 
It may be argued that the call for a return to Ho Chi Minh’s consti-
tutional thinking and the 1946 Constitution is strategic rather than sub-
stantial: the constitutional reformers have simply appropriated Ho Chi 
Minh and his constitution as an umbrella to avoid political sanction as 
their proposals have considerably challenged the dominant socialist po-
litical system. This assertion may be partially true, particularly with re-
spect to the dissidents. The dissidents have appropriated the 1946 Con-
stitution as the strategy to replace the current monist socialist 
constitutional system with a pluralist liberal constitutional democracy.253 
Particularly, the idea of constitutional referendum derived from the 
1946 charter has been vehemently mobilized by the dissidents as a 
peaceful means for substantial political change.254 The dissidents seem 
to believe that the majority of the Vietnamese people are now unhappy 
with the current domination of the communist regime and desire for a 
liberal constitutional democracy.255 The dissidents seemingly hope that 
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through a referendum, the Vietnamese people may vote against the re-
vised constitution drafted under the communist leadership, which is the 
legitimate base for a change to a liberal democracy.256 In addition, the 
dissidents’ instrumental approach also leads to some criticisms of the 
deficiencies of the 1946 Constitution, for example, an un-
democratically elected powerful presidency and the absence of a consti-
tutional review system.257 
But, the approach to the constitutional values of the founding gen-
eration supported by the Vietnamese establishment restoration constitu-
tionalists is more substantial rather than merely strategic. Iyer notes 
that: “In societies where the prior constitution is associated with strong 
unifying sentiments which have not been dimmed by the passage of 
time, a return to it is often compelling.”258 Inside Vietnam, the sanctity 
of Ho Chi Minh and his first constitution has been firmly established 
and has received popular sentimental acceptance, and this makes the 
possible restoration oriented change substantially attractive. The resto-
ration constitutionalists in Vietnam conceive the founding constitutional 
values as the embodiment of universal constitutional standards and Ho 
Chi Minh’s perspicacity, and publicly present the pride of the nation’s 
constitutional history.259 Accordingly, they have continuously utilized 
Hồ Chí Minh’s constitutionalism and the 1946 Constitution to justify 
their proposals for incremental renovation of the constitutional system 
by re-applying some liberal constitutional concepts and institutions 
without calling for a radical political change to Western liberal democ-
racy.260 
But that does not mean that the Vietnamese discourse of restora-
tion constitutionalism presents a fear of modernization and Westerniza-
tion as it did in the cases of some Eastern European societies.261 In fact, 
twenty-first century Vietnam presents a clear trend toward moderniza-
tion, industrialization, and globalization. Hence, the Vietnamese dis-
course of restoration constitutionalism emerges not as hostile to, but 
quite conversely, as amicable to modernization and Westernization. The 
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founding constitutional values are rendered as comparable to universal 
constitutional standards practiced in the West, and they are forcefully 
referred to so as to legitimize and justify the reformations of the Viet-
namese socialist constitutional system in line with the zeitgeist of the 
modern and Western world. 
2. Limited Effects 
In the context of Vietnam, the party and the state control the 
ground rules determining the actors and contents of the fora of constitu-
tional debates in general and the discourse of restoration constitutional-
ism in particular. Since the restoration, constitutionalists’ proposals sub-
stantially conflict with the current orthodox constitutional ideology and 
considerably challenge the current socialist political regime. The politi-
cal leadership is relatively skeptical about the restoration movement. 
Consequently, incumbent political leaders and constitution-makers un-
der their strict control may present their pride of and respect to Ho Chi 
Minh’s constitutional thought and the 1946 Constitution, but they have 
refrained from discussions on their possible restoration. To illustrate, on 
November 19, 2013, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng officially an-
nounced the adoption date of the 1946 Constitution – November 19 as 
the “Law Day of Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” In his address that 
day, he stated: 
The 1946 Constitution was imbued with Ho Chi Minh’s 
thought of democracy and the rule of law, respecting the values 
of human rights and citizen’s rights . . . At its historical era, the 
1946 Constitution was a democratic and progressive constitu-
tion of Democratic Republic of Vietnam to be in no way infe-
rior to any constitutions in the world . . . Ho Chi Minh’s consti-
tutional thought and the values of democracy, human rights, 
citizen’s rights, and the notion and model of a state of the peo-
ple, by the people, and for the people established by the 1946 
Constitution have been a leitmotif penetrating throughout the 
amended constitutions and entire legal system of our coun-
try.262 
Despite the challenging nature of the restoration discourse, the po-
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litical leadership is compelled to allow them to enter into the array of 
national constitutional dialogues, as these discourses have been ad-
vanced on a highly powerful base – namely Hồ Chí Minh. Particularly, 
a large-scale campaign called “Campaign to Study and Follow Hồ Chí 
Minh’s Moral Example” initiated on November 7, 2006 by the Politburo 
(term X) of the Communist Party of Vietnam, reconfirmed by the Polit-
buro (term XI)’s decree on May 14, 2011, provides a relatively safe 
base for the constitutional restoration movement.263 While the party’s 
campaign focuses mainly on the restoration of Ho Chi Minh’s morality, 
the restoration constitutionalists have taken advantage of the campaign 
to expand to another movement of restoration of his constitutionalism 
and his first Constitution. To the party, a return to Hồ Chí Minh’s mo-
rality is more acceptable, as this does not threaten the institutional es-
sence of the political system as the restoration movement does. There-
fore, a divergence between the party’s endorsement of Ho Chi Minh’s 
morality and the social endorsement of his constitutionalism is overt. 
The political leadership may tolerate some restoration arguments that do 
not substantially challenge the current regime, like the ones about hu-
man rights protection and judicial independence, but would limit and 
even exclude from the official fora the restoration arguments which are 
highly threatening to the regime, like the calls for change of the nation’s 
name and multi-party system. 
Consequently, the influence of the discourse of restoration consti-
tutionalism on the new constitution of Vietnam enacted in late 2013 is 
considerably limited. The new Constitution explicitly rejects a number 
of the restoration proposals, like popular sovereignty, popular ratifica-
tion of the constitution, a multi-party system, and any change of the na-
tion’s name.264 A rare reaction to the substantial rejections of the resto-
ration proposals in official media is the case of Dương Trung Quốc – a 
vehement advocate of the restoration movement and one of the two Na-
tional delegates who did not vote on the new Constitution. One of the 
reasons for his choice, according to his explanation, is the new Constitu-
tion’s continuing confirmation of the leadership of the Communist Party 
which goes against the founding experience. In the interview with Tuổi 
trẻ Newspaper, he stated: 
We should repeatedly read the former constitutions, espe-
cially the constitutions enacted under the leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh, from which we can realize that the Party has always 
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played the definitive role, but the art of its leadership was dif-
ferent in that [the party’s leadership] was not directly ex-
pressed in the constitutions, because the nation and the people 
are supreme. With these reasons, I have chosen not to vote.265 
However, the restoration constitutional movement does not com-
pletely fail. In fact, the new Constitution includes several rhetoric and 
institutional changes seemingly less vulnerable to the socialist regime, 
which, to a certain degree, can be attributed to the contribution of the 
restoration constitutional discourse. First, although the new Constitution 
rejected the call for referendum, it recognizes in the preamble that the 
Vietnamese people are authorized to make the Constitution, despite a 
rhetoric rather than significantly meaningful recognition.266 Second, alt-
hough the petition to change the nation’s name to “Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam” was ignored, specific references to “socialism” have been 
considerably reduced in the new Constitution.267 Notably, the principle 
of socialist legality featuring the 1992 Constitution was removed in the 
new charter. Third, although the new Constitution rejected the proposal 
of a powerful presidency, it strengthens the power of the State President 
vis-à-vis the Government to a certain degree, by, for instance, allowing 
the State President to request for the meeting of the Government in nec-
essary cases.268 Fourth, a number of right provisions have been rewritten 
to reduce the impression of statist rights by, for example, removing the 
phrase “in accordance to the law” in several provisions, although the 
substantial meaning of the rights remains intact.269 Fifth, the commit-
ment to judicial independence is strengthened in the new Constitution, 
through explicit recognition of the role of the courts in protecting justice 
and human rights and the prohibition of interference by other State bod-
ies in judicial adjudications. For future practice, the new Constitution 
has not specified the organization of courts at the local level, opening 
the door for realization of the 2005 Party project to re-organize local 
courts in a way that separates them from local governments. In short, 
the discourse of restoration constitutionalism has resulted in some lim-
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ited technical and rhetorical resonation in the new Constitution. 
3. Prospects 
Vietnamese restoration constitutionalism may continue to increase 
in the future albeit still under the control of the political leadership. The 
2013 Constitution rejects a number of constitutional proposals intro-
duced during the period of public constitutional consultation including 
the restoration proposals. Several liberal and democratic features in Ho 
Chi Minh’s constitutional statements of the pre-revolutionary era and in 
the 1946 Constitution may continue to be invoked in future debates over 
institutional and constitutional reforms. The tremendously influential 
position of Hồ Chí Minh in modern Vietnam constitutes a firm base for 
the continuing development of Vietnamese restoration constitutional 
movement. The party and state leaders may continue to afford the resto-
rationist discourse, although they would not allow them to be compre-
hensively implemented. 
Despite the limited practice, the social meaning of the restoration-
ist discourse is by no means insignificant. In fact, the discourse of Viet-
namese restoration constitutionalism has moved beyond the academic 
fora and reached widely to the public thanks to its dissemination on 
mass media, especially on the Internet. The public restorationist dis-
course is consequential in that it arouses the popular consciousness on 
the lost liberal constitutional values and envisages these values as a re-
ferred option for political change in future Vietnam. 
In practical dimension, the Vietnamese political leadership may 
endorse selective and conditioned restoration of some institutions of the 
1946 Constitution which they deem do not substantially challenge the 
current regime. In the 2001 constitutional amendments, the 1946 Con-
stitution’s institution of vote of no confidence was restored and revised 
as vote of confidence.270 The independent court system established by 
the 1946 Constitution may be also restored in a similar manner. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The percept of this paper is that radical rupture is not a necessity 
for the operation of constitutionalism. Recent experiences indicate that 
restoration constitutionalism presents a new path of constitutional de-
velopment in socialist East Asia. 
Restoration constitutionalism has its own advantages. The restora-
tion modality of constitutionalism has potential to accrue more legiti-
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macy than efforts to establish a new constitutional beginning as a clean-
break with the past, since the modality of restoration is consistent with 
the general logics of constitutional continuity and presents change as in 
keeping with the nation’s proud constitutional history, helping to reduce 
the risk of social and political chaos, and hence making it easier to gain 
consensus for political change. 
Critics of restoration constitutionalism may argue that past consti-
tutional experiences may be mistaken. In fact, retrospective constitu-
tional law does not mean a haphazard loyalty to past facts. As Dowdle 
argues, “The flaws of that actual experience are not obstacles to its ca-
pacity to serve as a foundation for constructing a new constitutionalism. 
The seeds for future constitutional emergence and development and the 
ideals and values it is used to reference are found in the social meaning 
of that experience and not in its factual history per se.”271 Restoration 
constitutionalism means a return not to constitutional facts but constitu-
tional norms or constitutional ideals and values attached to “the social 
meaning” of past constitutional discourse and practice.272 
Another criticism of restoration constitutionalism may be that there 
is no fixed set of past values, and this is the cause for their potential ar-
bitrary interpretations. This may be true, but there is way to avoid such 
a scenario, that is through well-institutionalized popular restoration con-
stitutional discourse. The people themselves, rather than merely selec-
tive elites, should engage in fair, transparent, and public discourse to in-
terpret and determine the meanings of the past constitutional values. 
This is a long-term process. It would take years and even decades for 
public discourse to give meaning to the past constitutional values. 
Finally, it may be also criticized that because the discourse of res-
toration constitutionalism is an antagonism to socialism, its develop-
ment is unlikely in the current status of China and Vietnam. This is par-
tially true. But, it is possible in the two nations to conduct public 
discourse so as to give meaning to the past liberal constitutional concep-
tions and social movements without explicitly calling for their return. 
Compared to China, the discourse of restoration constitutionalism has 
more space to develop in Vietnam because of the influential position of 
Ho Chi Minh. Vietnamese legal scholars and other intellectuals may 
continuously discuss the meaning of the past liberal constitutional val-
ues and their relevance to the current constitutional issues in the nation. 
In addition, it can be anticipated that in a long run, the discourse of res-
toration constitutionalism in Vietnam may move beyond Ho Chi Minh 
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and his 1946 Constitution to elucidate the meaning of conceptions and 
social movements by other early Vietnamese constitutionalists. 
 
